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authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2017-04-07 10:47:16 -0400
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2017-04-07 10:47:16 -0400
commit4812441d3465f4f2fc6763ee644f79d5a9c8661b (patch)
tree6a6f9b7d7325b7b68ba39b8ac54f556ec1d0285d /configure.ac
parent7d7770f7359763871667e0150aebc50856f9d5fd (diff)
downloadtor-4812441d3465f4f2fc6763ee644f79d5a9c8661b.tar.gz
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Never read off the end of a buffer in base32_encode()
When we "fixed" #18280 in 4e4a7d2b0c199227252a742541461ec4cc35d358 in 0291 it appears that we introduced a bug: The base32_encode function can read off the end of the input buffer, if the input buffer size modulo 5 is not equal to 0 or 3. This is not completely horrible, for two reasons: * The extra bits that are read are never actually used: so this is only a crash when asan is enabled, in the worst case. Not a data leak. * The input sizes passed to base32_encode are only ever multiples of 5. They are all either DIGEST_LEN (20), REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN (10), sizeof(rand_bytes) in addressmap.c (10), or an input in crypto.c that is forced to a multiple of 5. So this bug can't actually trigger in today's Tor. Closes bug 21894; bugfix on 0.2.9.1-alpha.
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