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author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2012-01-05 14:16:30 -0500 |
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committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2012-01-05 14:16:30 -0500 |
commit | ccd8289958b6d81cd5575c15dc6c1218d8ecb2d0 (patch) | |
tree | 568858ae72ea323c5dae8f35c684997faafc6d5d /changes | |
parent | a1074c7aa2afab595d434c52754ee47cec404189 (diff) | |
parent | b839ace7d092fe073b66a2d7d329644e82ec843b (diff) | |
download | tor-ccd8289958b6d81cd5575c15dc6c1218d8ecb2d0.tar.gz tor-ccd8289958b6d81cd5575c15dc6c1218d8ecb2d0.zip |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.1' into maint-0.2.2
Diffstat (limited to 'changes')
-rw-r--r-- | changes/bug4822 | 13 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/changes/bug4822 b/changes/bug4822 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..73f43f0452 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug4822 @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ + o Major security workaround: + - When building or running with any version of OpenSSL earlier + than 0.9.8s or 1.0.0f, disable SSLv3 support. These versions had + a bug (CVE-2011-4576) in which their block cipher padding + included uninitialized data, potentially leaking sensitive + information to any peer with whom they made a SSLv3 + connection. Tor does not use SSL v3 by default, but a hostile + client or server could force an SSLv3 connection in order to + gain information that they shouldn't have been able to get. The + best solution here is to upgrade to OpenSSL 0.9.8s or 1.0.0f (or + later). But when building or running with a non-upgraded + OpenSSL, we should instead make sure that the bug can't happen + by disabling SSLv3 entirely. |