diff options
author | George Kadianakis <desnacked@riseup.net> | 2015-07-23 17:43:42 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2015-07-23 11:01:19 -0400 |
commit | 9bd9244675e8d969cc00b8d7f675bcb4151de93a (patch) | |
tree | f00f7c93d6188086f9965fb80cdc41aade5de67a /ChangeLog | |
parent | 2f41dc3b9ead65402121132b03c7e4758117025b (diff) | |
download | tor-9bd9244675e8d969cc00b8d7f675bcb4151de93a.tar.gz tor-9bd9244675e8d969cc00b8d7f675bcb4151de93a.zip |
Minor changelog tweaks
Diffstat (limited to 'ChangeLog')
-rw-r--r-- | ChangeLog | 9 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 5 deletions
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.7.2-alpha - 2015-07-2? This, the second alpha in the Tor 0.2.7 series, has a number of new - features, including a manual approach to picking the number of - introduction points for hidden services, and the much stronger Ed25519 + features, including a way to manually pick the number of introduction + points for hidden services, and the much stronger Ed25519 signing key algorithm for regular Tor relays (including support for encrypted offline identity keys in the new algorithm). @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.7.2-alpha - 2015-07-2? - Remove the adaptive algorithm for chosing the number of introduction points, which tended to leak popularity information by changing the amount of introduction points depending on the - amount of traffic the HS sees. Closes ticket 4862. + amount of clients the HS sees. Closes ticket 4862. o Major features (onion key cross-certification): - Relay descriptors now include signatures of their own identity @@ -67,8 +67,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.7.2-alpha - 2015-07-2? regression detailed in bug 16381). This is a temporary fix since we can live with the minor issue in bug 14219 (it just results in some load on the network) but the regression of 16381 is too much - of a setback. First-round fix for bug 16381; bugfix - on 0.2.6.3-alpha. + of a setback. First-round fix for bug 16381; bugfix on 0.2.6.3-alpha. o Major bugfixes (hidden services): - When cannibalizing a circuit for an introduction point, always |