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authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2018-03-28 07:49:34 -0400
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2018-03-28 07:49:34 -0400
commitd416e208e4e94c2b4ccd4e11013151c72180faff (patch)
treef35bc9f3fd3336d82133b41352717870cc405d60
parentddee28a3c9b9dd256cd6560a4766f17a6c6fc13d (diff)
parentd4bf1f6c8eb08c39def69c839515afe475bf0a6b (diff)
downloadtor-d416e208e4e94c2b4ccd4e11013151c72180faff.tar.gz
tor-d416e208e4e94c2b4ccd4e11013151c72180faff.zip
Merge branch 'bugs25036_25055_clean_033' into maint-0.3.3
-rw-r--r--changes/bugs_25036_250557
-rw-r--r--src/common/util.c72
-rw-r--r--src/common/util.h3
-rw-r--r--src/or/proto_socks.c4
-rw-r--r--src/test/test_socks.c24
-rw-r--r--src/test/test_util.c68
6 files changed, 138 insertions, 40 deletions
diff --git a/changes/bugs_25036_25055 b/changes/bugs_25036_25055
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..daa46321c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/bugs_25036_25055
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+ o Minor bugfixes (networking):
+ - Tor will not reject IPv6 address strings from TorBrowser when they
+ are passed as hostnames in SOCKS5 requests. Fixes bug 25036,
+ bugfix on Tor 0.3.1.2.
+ - string_is_valid_hostname() will not consider IP strings to be valid
+ hostnames. Fixes bug 25055; bugfix on Tor 0.2.5.5.
+
diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c
index 90204befc0..a68fd30d09 100644
--- a/src/common/util.c
+++ b/src/common/util.c
@@ -1071,6 +1071,36 @@ string_is_valid_ipv6_address(const char *string)
return (tor_inet_pton(AF_INET6,string,&addr) == 1);
}
+/** Return true iff <b>string</b> is a valid destination address,
+ * i.e. either a DNS hostname or IPv4/IPv6 address string.
+ */
+int
+string_is_valid_dest(const char *string)
+{
+ char *tmp = NULL;
+ int retval;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (string == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ len = strlen(string);
+
+ if (len == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (string[0] == '[' && string[len - 1] == ']')
+ string = tmp = tor_strndup(string + 1, len - 2);
+
+ retval = string_is_valid_ipv4_address(string) ||
+ string_is_valid_ipv6_address(string) ||
+ string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname(string);
+
+ tor_free(tmp);
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
/** Return true iff <b>string</b> matches a pattern of DNS names
* that we allow Tor clients to connect to.
*
@@ -1078,37 +1108,51 @@ string_is_valid_ipv6_address(const char *string)
* with misconfigured zones that have been encountered in the wild.
*/
int
-string_is_valid_hostname(const char *string)
+string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname(const char *string)
{
int result = 1;
+ int has_trailing_dot;
+ char *last_label;
smartlist_t *components;
+ if (!string || strlen(string) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (string_is_valid_ipv4_address(string))
+ return 0;
+
components = smartlist_new();
smartlist_split_string(components,string,".",0,0);
+ if (BUG(smartlist_len(components) == 0))
+ return 0; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE should be impossible given the earlier checks.
+
+ /* Allow a single terminating '.' used rarely to indicate domains
+ * are FQDNs rather than relative. */
+ last_label = (char *)smartlist_get(components,
+ smartlist_len(components) - 1);
+ has_trailing_dot = (last_label[0] == '\0');
+ if (has_trailing_dot) {
+ smartlist_pop_last(components);
+ tor_free(last_label);
+ last_label = NULL;
+ }
+
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(components, char *, c) {
if ((c[0] == '-') || (*c == '_')) {
result = 0;
break;
}
- /* Allow a single terminating '.' used rarely to indicate domains
- * are FQDNs rather than relative. */
- if ((c_sl_idx > 0) && (c_sl_idx + 1 == c_sl_len) && !*c) {
- continue;
- }
-
do {
- if ((*c >= 'a' && *c <= 'z') ||
- (*c >= 'A' && *c <= 'Z') ||
- (*c >= '0' && *c <= '9') ||
- (*c == '-') || (*c == '_'))
- c++;
- else
- result = 0;
+ result = (TOR_ISALNUM(*c) || (*c == '-') || (*c == '_'));
+ c++;
} while (result && *c);
+ if (result == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(c);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(components, char *, c) {
diff --git a/src/common/util.h b/src/common/util.h
index 2ee0ea28cd..9380789128 100644
--- a/src/common/util.h
+++ b/src/common/util.h
@@ -233,7 +233,8 @@ const char *find_str_at_start_of_line(const char *haystack,
const char *needle);
int string_is_C_identifier(const char *string);
int string_is_key_value(int severity, const char *string);
-int string_is_valid_hostname(const char *string);
+int string_is_valid_dest(const char *string);
+int string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname(const char *string);
int string_is_valid_ipv4_address(const char *string);
int string_is_valid_ipv6_address(const char *string);
diff --git a/src/or/proto_socks.c b/src/or/proto_socks.c
index 91633d02af..8700fe1269 100644
--- a/src/or/proto_socks.c
+++ b/src/or/proto_socks.c
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req,
req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+5+len));
*drain_out = 5+len+2;
- if (!string_is_valid_hostname(req->address)) {
+ if (!string_is_valid_dest(req->address)) {
socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR);
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req,
log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Everything is here. Success.");
strlcpy(req->address, startaddr ? startaddr : tmpbuf,
sizeof(req->address));
- if (!string_is_valid_hostname(req->address)) {
+ if (!string_is_valid_dest(req->address)) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
"Your application (using socks4 to port %d) gave Tor "
"a malformed hostname: %s. Rejecting the connection.",
diff --git a/src/test/test_socks.c b/src/test/test_socks.c
index 9ae7530e22..8da7191e82 100644
--- a/src/test/test_socks.c
+++ b/src/test/test_socks.c
@@ -347,17 +347,35 @@ test_socks_5_supported_commands(void *ptr)
socks_request_clear(socks);
- /* SOCKS 5 should NOT reject RESOLVE [F0] reject for IPv6 address
+ /* SOCKS 5 should NOT reject RESOLVE [F0] request for IPv6 address
* string if SafeSocks is enabled. */
ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x01\x00");
+ ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\xF0\x00\x03\x29");
+ ADD_DATA(buf, "[2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334]");
+ ADD_DATA(buf, "\x01\x02");
+ tt_int_op(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, 1),
+ OP_EQ, 1);
+
+ tt_str_op("[2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334]", OP_EQ,
+ socks->address);
+ tt_int_op(258, OP_EQ, socks->port);
+
+ tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, buf_datalen(buf));
+
+ socks_request_clear(socks);
+
+ /* Also allow bracket-less form. */
+
+ ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x01\x00");
ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\xF0\x00\x03\x27");
ADD_DATA(buf, "2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334");
ADD_DATA(buf, "\x01\x02");
tt_int_op(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, 1),
- OP_EQ, -1);
+ OP_EQ, 1);
- tt_str_op("2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334", OP_EQ, socks->address);
+ tt_str_op("2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334", OP_EQ,
+ socks->address);
tt_int_op(258, OP_EQ, socks->port);
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, buf_datalen(buf));
diff --git a/src/test/test_util.c b/src/test/test_util.c
index b67fad58e3..036f739b89 100644
--- a/src/test/test_util.c
+++ b/src/test/test_util.c
@@ -5542,47 +5542,74 @@ test_util_max_mem(void *arg)
}
static void
+test_util_dest_validation_edgecase(void *arg)
+{
+ (void)arg;
+
+ tt_assert(!string_is_valid_dest(NULL));
+ tt_assert(!string_is_valid_dest(""));
+
+ done:
+ return;
+}
+
+static void
test_util_hostname_validation(void *arg)
{
(void)arg;
// Lets try valid hostnames first.
- tt_assert(string_is_valid_hostname("torproject.org"));
- tt_assert(string_is_valid_hostname("ocw.mit.edu"));
- tt_assert(string_is_valid_hostname("i.4cdn.org"));
- tt_assert(string_is_valid_hostname("stanford.edu"));
- tt_assert(string_is_valid_hostname("multiple-words-with-hypens.jp"));
+ tt_assert(string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("torproject.org"));
+ tt_assert(string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("ocw.mit.edu"));
+ tt_assert(string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("i.4cdn.org"));
+ tt_assert(string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("stanford.edu"));
+ tt_assert(string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("multiple-words-with-hypens.jp"));
// Subdomain name cannot start with '-' or '_'.
- tt_assert(!string_is_valid_hostname("-torproject.org"));
- tt_assert(!string_is_valid_hostname("subdomain.-domain.org"));
- tt_assert(!string_is_valid_hostname("-subdomain.domain.org"));
- tt_assert(!string_is_valid_hostname("___abc.org"));
+ tt_assert(!string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("-torproject.org"));
+ tt_assert(!string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("subdomain.-domain.org"));
+ tt_assert(!string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("-subdomain.domain.org"));
+ tt_assert(!string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("___abc.org"));
// Hostnames cannot contain non-alphanumeric characters.
- tt_assert(!string_is_valid_hostname("%%domain.\\org."));
- tt_assert(!string_is_valid_hostname("***x.net"));
- tt_assert(!string_is_valid_hostname("\xff\xffxyz.org"));
- tt_assert(!string_is_valid_hostname("word1 word2.net"));
+ tt_assert(!string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("%%domain.\\org."));
+ tt_assert(!string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("***x.net"));
+ tt_assert(!string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("\xff\xffxyz.org"));
+ tt_assert(!string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("word1 word2.net"));
// Test workaround for nytimes.com stupidity, technically invalid,
// but we allow it since they are big, even though they are failing to
// comply with a ~30 year old standard.
- tt_assert(string_is_valid_hostname("core3_euw1.fabrik.nytimes.com"));
+ tt_assert(string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("core3_euw1.fabrik.nytimes.com"));
// Firefox passes FQDNs with trailing '.'s directly to the SOCKS proxy,
// which is redundant since the spec states DOMAINNAME addresses are fully
// qualified. While unusual, this should be tollerated.
- tt_assert(string_is_valid_hostname("core9_euw1.fabrik.nytimes.com."));
- tt_assert(!string_is_valid_hostname("..washingtonpost.is.better.com"));
- tt_assert(!string_is_valid_hostname("so.is..ft.com"));
- tt_assert(!string_is_valid_hostname("..."));
+ tt_assert(string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("core9_euw1.fabrik.nytimes.com."));
+ tt_assert(!string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname(
+ "..washingtonpost.is.better.com"));
+ tt_assert(!string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("so.is..ft.com"));
+ tt_assert(!string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("..."));
// XXX: do we allow single-label DNS names?
// We shouldn't for SOCKS (spec says "contains a fully-qualified domain name"
// but only test pathologically malformed traling '.' cases for now.
- tt_assert(!string_is_valid_hostname("."));
- tt_assert(!string_is_valid_hostname(".."));
+ tt_assert(!string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("."));
+ tt_assert(!string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname(".."));
+
+ // IP address strings are not hostnames.
+ tt_assert(!string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("8.8.8.8"));
+ tt_assert(!string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("[2a00:1450:401b:800::200e]"));
+ tt_assert(!string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("2a00:1450:401b:800::200e"));
+
+ // We allow alphanumeric TLDs. For discussion, see ticket #25055.
+ tt_assert(string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("lucky.13"));
+ tt_assert(string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("luck.y13"));
+ tt_assert(string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("luck.y13."));
+
+ // We allow punycode TLDs. For examples, see
+ // http://data.iana.org/TLD/tlds-alpha-by-domain.txt
+ tt_assert(string_is_valid_nonrfc_hostname("example.xn--l1acc"));
done:
return;
@@ -6208,6 +6235,7 @@ struct testcase_t util_tests[] = {
&passthrough_setup, (void*)"1" },
UTIL_TEST(max_mem, 0),
UTIL_TEST(hostname_validation, 0),
+ UTIL_TEST(dest_validation_edgecase, 0),
UTIL_TEST(ipv4_validation, 0),
UTIL_TEST(writepid, 0),
UTIL_TEST(get_avail_disk_space, 0),