Correct further grammatical errors in tor comments

Avoid using a pronoun where it makes comments unclear.
Avoid using gender for things that don't have it.
Avoid assigning gender to people unnecessarily.

8 files changed, 12 insertions, 11 deletions

diff --git a/src/common/compat.c b/src/common/compat.c
index c1d4f89621..fb22e922ba 100644
--- a/src/common/compat.c
+++ b/src/common/compat.c
@@ -717,7 +717,8 @@ strtok_helper(char *cp, const char *sep)
 }
 
 /** Implementation of strtok_r for platforms whose coders haven't figured out
- * how to write one.  Hey guys!  You can use this code here for free! */
+ * how to write one.  Hey, retrograde libc developers!  You can use this code
+ * here for free! */
 char *
 tor_strtok_r_impl(char *str, const char *sep, char **lasts)
 {
diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c
index efe804df28..123c33a876 100644
--- a/src/or/connection.c
+++ b/src/or/connection.c
@@ -3606,7 +3606,7 @@ connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read,
   }
 
   /* Call even if result is 0, since the global read bucket may
-   * have reached 0 on a different conn, and this guy needs to
+   * have reached 0 on a different conn, and this connection needs to
    * know to stop reading. */
   connection_consider_empty_read_buckets(conn);
   if (n_written > 0 && connection_is_writing(conn))
@@ -4102,7 +4102,7 @@ connection_handle_write_impl(connection_t *conn, int force)
   }
 
   /* Call even if result is 0, since the global write bucket may
-   * have reached 0 on a different conn, and this guy needs to
+   * have reached 0 on a different conn, and this connection needs to
    * know to stop writing. */
   connection_consider_empty_write_buckets(conn);
   if (n_read > 0 && connection_is_reading(conn))
diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c
index 758d583c39..dd81142094 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_edge.c
+++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c
@@ -2951,8 +2951,8 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
       return 0;
     }
     /* Make sure to get the 'real' address of the previous hop: the
-     * caller might want to know whether his IP address has changed, and
-     * we might already have corrected base_.addr[ess] for the relay's
+     * caller might want to know whether the remote IP address has changed,
+     * and we might already have corrected base_.addr[ess] for the relay's
      * canonical IP address. */
     if (or_circ && or_circ->p_chan)
       address = tor_strdup(channel_get_actual_remote_address(or_circ->p_chan));
diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c
index d778eb3b4f..29e8153d89 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_or.c
+++ b/src/or/connection_or.c
@@ -1585,7 +1585,7 @@ connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_connection_t *conn)
  *
  * If we initiated this connection (<b>started_here</b> is true), make sure
  * the other side sent a correctly formed certificate. If I initiated the
- * connection, make sure it's the right guy.
+ * connection, make sure it's the right relay by checking the certificate.
  *
  * Otherwise (if we _didn't_ initiate this connection), it's okay for
  * the certificate to be weird or absent.
@@ -1601,7 +1601,7 @@ connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_connection_t *conn)
  * 1) Set conn->circ_id_type according to tor-spec.txt.
  * 2) If we're an authdirserver and we initiated the connection: drop all
  *    descriptors that claim to be on that IP/port but that aren't
- *    this guy; and note that this guy is reachable.
+ *    this relay; and note that this relay is reachable.
  * 3) If this is a bridge and we didn't configure its identity
  *    fingerprint, remember the keyid we just learned.
  */
diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c
index 620d324704..491557e9cd 100644
--- a/src/or/dirserv.c
+++ b/src/or/dirserv.c
@@ -3135,7 +3135,7 @@ dirserv_get_routerdescs(smartlist_t *descs_out, const char *key,
  * router listening at <b>address</b>:<b>or_port</b>, and has yielded
  * a certificate with digest <b>digest_rcvd</b>.
  *
- * Inform the reachability checker that we could get to this guy.
+ * Inform the reachability checker that we could get to this relay.
  */
 void
 dirserv_orconn_tls_done(const tor_addr_t *addr,
diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h
index 103e76dff6..6faeb34d56 100644
--- a/src/or/or.h
+++ b/src/or/or.h
@@ -1308,7 +1308,7 @@ typedef struct connection_t {
                               * marked.) */
   const char *marked_for_close_file; /**< For debugging: in which file were
                                       * we marked for close? */
-  char *address; /**< FQDN (or IP) of the guy on the other end.
+  char *address; /**< FQDN (or IP) of the other end.
                   * strdup into this, because free_connection() frees it. */
   /** Another connection that's connected to this one in lieu of a socket. */
   struct connection_t *linked_conn;
diff --git a/src/or/policies.c b/src/or/policies.c
index c9bce1b234..4706a9da72 100644
--- a/src/or/policies.c
+++ b/src/or/policies.c
@@ -2036,7 +2036,7 @@ compare_tor_addr_to_short_policy(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
    * allows exit enclaving. Trying it anyway would open up a cool attack
    * where the node refuses due to exitpolicy, the client reacts in
    * surprise by rewriting the node's exitpolicy to reject *:*, and then
-   * a bad guy targets users by causing them to attempt such connections
+   * an adversary targets users by causing them to attempt such connections
    * to 98% of the exits.
    *
    * Once microdescriptors can handle addresses in special cases (e.g. if
diff --git a/src/test/test_dir.c b/src/test/test_dir.c
index 05fbe0a4f6..4824a94132 100644
--- a/src/test/test_dir.c
+++ b/src/test/test_dir.c
@@ -3238,7 +3238,7 @@ test_dir_packages(void *arg)
   ADD(4, "clownshoes 22alpha4 http://quumble.example.cam/ blake2=fooa");
   ADD(5, "clownshoes 22alpha4 http://quumble.example.cam/ blake2=fooa");
 
-  /* Five votes for A ... all from the same guy.  Three for B. */
+  /* Five votes for A ... all from the same authority.  Three for B. */
   ADD(0, "cbc 99.1.11.1.1 http://example.com/cbc/ cubehash=ahooy sha512=m");
   ADD(1, "cbc 99.1.11.1.1 http://example.com/cbc/ cubehash=ahooy sha512=m");
   ADD(3, "cbc 99.1.11.1.1 http://example.com/cbc/ cubehash=ahooy sha512=m");