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| author | Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> | 2014-09-19 21:44:23 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> | 2014-09-19 21:44:23 -0400 |
| commit | 0b004ba5c0c00b9d367b5a1e305f9e4e9adc65b6 (patch) | |
| tree | 966587a60558be3021054b354d74329baf7f91dc | |
| parent | 396ac67f62de47648193b922122da65a392a1b98 (diff) | |
| parent | be0e26272b3e795b902394acc9b66642fcdc1f21 (diff) | |
| download | tor-0b004ba5c0c00b9d367b5a1e305f9e4e9adc65b6.tar.gz tor-0b004ba5c0c00b9d367b5a1e305f9e4e9adc65b6.zip | |
Merge branch 'maint-0.2.5' into release-0.2.5
| -rw-r--r-- | changes/bug13151-client | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/rendclient.c | 2 |
2 files changed, 14 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/changes/bug13151-client b/changes/bug13151-client new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1218dfdfab --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug13151-client @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - Clients now send the correct address for their chosen rendezvous + point when trying to access a hidden service. They used to send + the wrong address, which would still work some of the time because + they also sent the identity digest of the rendezvous point, and if + the hidden service happened to try connecting to the rendezvous + point from a relay that already had a connection open to it, + the relay would reuse that connection. Now connections to hidden + services should be more robust and faster. Also, this bug meant + that clients were leaking to the hidden service whether they were + on a little-endian (common) or big-endian (rare) system, which for + some users might have reduced their anonymity. Fixes bug 13151; + bugfix on 0.2.1.5-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index d42024010d..19a8cef1bf 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc, extend_info_t *extend_info = rendcirc->build_state->chosen_exit; int klen; /* nul pads */ - set_uint32(tmp+v3_shift+1, tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&extend_info->addr)); + set_uint32(tmp+v3_shift+1, tor_addr_to_ipv4n(&extend_info->addr)); set_uint16(tmp+v3_shift+5, htons(extend_info->port)); memcpy(tmp+v3_shift+7, extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN); klen = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(extend_info->onion_key, |