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authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2013-12-18 11:49:44 -0500
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2013-12-18 11:53:07 -0500
commit7b87003957530427eadce36ed03b4645b481a335 (patch)
treef5e6f471eb9776e822309c34a530a87da9356933
parent561d9880f8025ddbcb2f0a586d0677908320af4f (diff)
downloadtor-7b87003957530427eadce36ed03b4645b481a335.tar.gz
tor-7b87003957530427eadce36ed03b4645b481a335.zip
Never allow OpenSSL engines to replace the RAND_SSLeay method
This fixes bug 10402, where the rdrand engine would use the rdrand instruction, not as an additional entropy source, but as a replacement for the entire userspace PRNG. That's obviously stupid: even if you don't think that RDRAND is a likely security risk, the right response to an alleged new alleged entropy source is never to throw away all previously used entropy sources. Thanks to coderman and rl1987 for diagnosing and tracking this down.
-rw-r--r--changes/bug1040211
-rw-r--r--src/common/crypto.c13
2 files changed, 21 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/changes/bug10402 b/changes/bug10402
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..eac00bdc6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/bug10402
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+ o Major bugfixes:
+ - Do not allow OpenSSL engines to replace the PRNG, even when
+ HardwareAccel is set. The only default builtin PRNG engine uses
+ the Intel RDRAND instruction to replace the entire PRNG, and
+ ignores all attempts to seed it with more entropy. That's
+ cryptographically stupid: the right response to a new alleged
+ entropy source is never to discard all previously used entropy
+ sources. Fixes bug 10402; works around behavior introduced in
+ OpenSSL 1.0.0. Diagnosis and investigation thanks to "coderman"
+ and "rl1987".
+
diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c
index 0ababeaea5..940a756f61 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto.c
+++ b/src/common/crypto.c
@@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ log_engine(const char *fn, ENGINE *e)
const char *name, *id;
name = ENGINE_get_name(e);
id = ENGINE_get_id(e);
- log_notice(LD_CRYPTO, "Using OpenSSL engine %s [%s] for %s",
- name?name:"?", id?id:"?", fn);
+ log_notice(LD_CRYPTO, "Default OpenSSL engine for %s is %s [%s]",
+ fn, name?name:"?", id?id:"?");
} else {
log_info(LD_CRYPTO, "Using default implementation for %s", fn);
}
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ crypto_global_init(int useAccel, const char *accelName, const char *accelDir)
}
log_engine("RSA", ENGINE_get_default_RSA());
log_engine("DH", ENGINE_get_default_DH());
- log_engine("RAND", ENGINE_get_default_RAND());
+ log_engine("RAND (which we will not use)", ENGINE_get_default_RAND());
log_engine("SHA1", ENGINE_get_digest_engine(NID_sha1));
log_engine("3DES", ENGINE_get_cipher_engine(NID_des_ede3_ecb));
log_engine("AES", ENGINE_get_cipher_engine(NID_aes_128_ecb));
@@ -297,6 +297,13 @@ crypto_global_init(int useAccel, const char *accelName, const char *accelDir)
log_info(LD_CRYPTO, "NOT using OpenSSL engine support.");
}
+ if (RAND_get_rand_method() != RAND_SSLeay()) {
+ log_notice(LD_CRYPTO, "It appears that one of our engines has provided "
+ "a replacement the OpenSSL RNG. Resetting it to the default "
+ "implementation.");
+ RAND_set_rand_method(RAND_SSLeay());
+ }
+
evaluate_evp_for_aes(-1);
evaluate_ctr_for_aes();