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authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2013-08-13 23:43:39 -0400
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2013-09-25 14:34:24 -0400
commitad763a336cb3655151383172bcfa658870ad8950 (patch)
tree95d5e30b8b9bf9fedefd08e132cecb4eefd780f9
parent938ee9b24dfda03a68a71d43b88e9fb00a90f9c8 (diff)
downloadtor-ad763a336cb3655151383172bcfa658870ad8950.tar.gz
tor-ad763a336cb3655151383172bcfa658870ad8950.zip
Re-enable TLS 1.[12] when building with OpenSSL >= 1.0.1e
To fix #6033, we disabled TLS 1.1 and 1.2. Eventually, OpenSSL fixed the bug behind #6033. I've considered alternate implementations that do more testing to see if there's secretly an OpenSSL 1.0.1c or something that secretly has a backport of the OpenSSL 1.0.1e fix, and decided against it on the grounds of complexity.
-rw-r--r--changes/bug60556
-rw-r--r--src/common/tortls.c3
2 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/changes/bug6055 b/changes/bug6055
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..00730073a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/bug6055
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+ o Major enhancements:
+ - Re-enable TLS 1.1 and 1.2 when built with OpenSSL 1.0.1e or later.
+ (OpenSSL before 1.0.1 didn't have TLS 1.1 or 1.2. OpenSSL from 1.0.1
+ through 1.0.1d had bugs that prevented renegotiation from working
+ with TLS 1.1 or 1.2, so we disabled them to solve bug 6033.) Fix for
+ issue #6055.
diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c
index b7e5bc1a5f..90ebb755f9 100644
--- a/src/common/tortls.c
+++ b/src/common/tortls.c
@@ -1269,12 +1269,15 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime,
* version. Once some version of OpenSSL does TLS1.1 and TLS1.2
* renegotiation properly, we can turn them back on when built with
* that version. */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(1,0,1,'e')
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2);
#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1);
#endif
+#endif
+
/* Disable TLS tickets if they're supported. We never want to use them;
* using them can make our perfect forward secrecy a little worse, *and*
* create an opportunity to fingerprint us (since it's unusual to use them