diff options
| author | Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com> | 2012-06-14 15:41:11 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2012-08-03 11:45:33 -0400 |
| commit | 82c5e385cbddec4fd80618d6e96111ad73d5a22e (patch) | |
| tree | 84f2fc784894b1af752a11faf569be9d03479a51 | |
| parent | 1040afb2425a8056dc41b35e6d825fc329663ee6 (diff) | |
| download | tor-82c5e385cbddec4fd80618d6e96111ad73d5a22e.tar.gz tor-82c5e385cbddec4fd80618d6e96111ad73d5a22e.zip | |
Remove bogus comment claiming that an assertion is triggerable by consensus
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/routerlist.c | 7 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index de1a66ce16..37de70f0b5 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -1983,9 +1983,10 @@ smartlist_choose_node_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl, if (is_guard) bitarray_set(guard_bits, i); if (is_known) { - bandwidths[i] = (int32_t) this_bw; // safe since MAX_BELIEVABLE<INT32_MAX - // XXX this is no longer true! We don't always cap the bw anymore. Can - // a consensus make us overflow?-sh + bandwidths[i] = (int32_t) this_bw; + /* Casting this_bw to int32_t is safe because both kb_to_bytes + and bridge_get_advertised_bandwidth_bounded limit it to below + INT32_MAX. */ tor_assert(bandwidths[i] >= 0); if (is_guard) total_guard_bw += this_bw; |