Dir auths reject relays running < Tor 0.1.2.14

Directory authorities now reject Tor relays with versions less than
0.1.2.14. This step cuts out four relays from the current network,
none of which are very big.

2 files changed, 9 insertions, 6 deletions

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 05e4373b38..ecf80b4413 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 Changes in version 0.2.2.4-alpha - 2009-??-??
   o Major bugfixes:
     - Fix another assert in the circuit_build_times code that causes Tor
-	  to fail to start once we have accumulated 5000 build times in the
-	  state file. Bugfix on 0.2.2.2-alpha; fixes bug 1108.
+      to fail to start once we have accumulated 5000 build times in the
+      state file. Bugfix on 0.2.2.2-alpha; fixes bug 1108.
 
   o Minor features:
     - Log SSL state transitions at debug level during handshake, and
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ Changes in version 0.2.2.4-alpha - 2009-??-??
       during the TLS handshake.
     - Revert to the "June 3 2009" ip-to-country file. The September one
       seems to have removed most US IP addresses.
+    - Directory authorities now reject Tor relays with versions less than
+      0.1.2.14. This step cuts out four relays from the current network,
+      none of which are very big.
 
   o Code simplifications and refactoring:
     - Revise our unit tests to use the "tinytest" framework, so we
diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c
index 1f4049bd54..5deb0ea413 100644
--- a/src/or/dirserv.c
+++ b/src/or/dirserv.c
@@ -371,10 +371,10 @@ dirserv_get_status_impl(const char *id_digest, const char *nickname,
               strmap_size(fingerprint_list->fp_by_name),
               digestmap_size(fingerprint_list->status_by_digest));
 
-  /* 0.1.1.17-rc was the first version that claimed to be stable, doesn't
-   * crash and drop circuits all the time, and is even vaguely compatible with
-   * the current network */
-  if (platform && !tor_version_as_new_as(platform,"0.1.1.17-rc")) {
+  /* Tor 0.1.2.x is pretty old, but there are a lot of them running still,
+   * and there aren't any critical relay-side vulnerabilities. Once more
+   * of them die off, we should raise this minimum to 0.2.0.x. */
+  if (platform && !tor_version_as_new_as(platform,"0.1.2.14")) {
     if (msg)
       *msg = "Tor version is far too old to work.";
     return FP_REJECT;