Merge branch 'maint-0.2.1'

3 files changed, 24 insertions, 11 deletions

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 5bd9a0e02f..fe07b9e955 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -115,6 +115,11 @@ Changes in version 0.2.1.20 - 2009-??-??
     - Fix an extremely rare infinite recursion bug that could occur if
       we tried to log a message after shutting down the log subsystem.
       Found by Matt Edman. Bugfix on 0.2.0.16-alpha.
+    - We were triggering a CLOCK_SKEW controller status event whenever
+      we connect via the v2 connection protocol to any relay that has
+      a wrong clock. Instead, we should only inform the controller when
+      it's a trusted authority that claims our clock is wrong. Bugfix
+      on 0.2.0.20-rc; starts to fix bug 1074. Reported by SwissTorExit.
 
 
 Changes in version 0.2.1.19 - 2009-07-28
diff --git a/doc/spec/control-spec.txt b/doc/spec/control-spec.txt
index fc4242ea16..1e3246e848 100644
--- a/doc/spec/control-spec.txt
+++ b/doc/spec/control-spec.txt
@@ -1254,20 +1254,26 @@
      CLOCK_SKEW
        SKEW="+" / "-" SECONDS
        MIN_SKEW="+" / "-" SECONDS.
-       SOURCE="DIRSERV:IP:Port" / "NETWORKSTATUS:IP:PORT" / "CONSENSUS"
+       SOURCE="DIRSERV:" IP ":" Port /
+              "NETWORKSTATUS:" IP ":" Port /
+              "OR:" IP ":" Port /
+              "CONSENSUS"
          If "SKEW" is present, it's an estimate of how far we are from the
          time declared in the source.  (In other words, if we're an hour in
          the past, the value is -3600.)  "MIN_SKEW" is present, it's a lower
          bound.  If the source is a DIRSERV, we got the current time from a
          connection to a dirserver.  If the source is a NETWORKSTATUS, we
          decided we're skewed because we got a v2 networkstatus from far in
-         the future.  If the source is CONSENSUS, we decided we're skewed
-         because we got a networkstatus consensus from the future.
-
-         {Controllers may want to warn the user if the skew is high, or if
-         multiple skew messages appear at severity WARN.  Controllers
-         shouldn't blindly adjust the clock, since the more accurate source
-         of skew info (DIRSERV) is currently unauthenticated.}
+         the future.  If the source is OR, the skew comes from a NETINFO
+         cell from a connection to another relay.  If the source is
+         CONSENSUS, we decided we're skewed because we got a networkstatus
+         consensus from the future.
+
+         {Tor should send this message to controllers when it thinks the
+         skew is so high that it will interfere with proper Tor operation.
+         Controllers shouldn't blindly adjust the clock, since the more
+         accurate source of skew info (DIRSERV) is currently
+         unauthenticated.}
 
      BAD_LIBEVENT
      "METHOD=" libevent method
diff --git a/src/or/command.c b/src/or/command.c
index c36874be5c..98f093a72b 100644
--- a/src/or/command.c
+++ b/src/or/command.c
@@ -610,9 +610,11 @@ command_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
            conn->_base.address, (int)conn->_base.port,
            apparent_skew>0 ? "ahead" : "behind", dbuf,
            apparent_skew>0 ? "behind" : "ahead");
-    control_event_general_status(LOG_WARN,
-                        "CLOCK_SKEW SKEW=%ld SOURCE=OR:%s:%d",
-                        apparent_skew, conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port);
+    if (severity == LOG_WARN) /* only tell the controller if an authority */
+      control_event_general_status(LOG_WARN,
+                          "CLOCK_SKEW SKEW=%ld SOURCE=OR:%s:%d",
+                          apparent_skew,
+                          conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port);
   }
 
   /* XXX maybe act on my_apparent_addr, if the source is sufficiently