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authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2011-01-15 11:22:25 -0500
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2011-01-15 14:10:52 -0500
commit9b09627edd2e1dcaed4ca8382bde3cf608ce6a81 (patch)
tree1d67878f751804196e0b202fb214e0bf5078066d
parentb97b0efec81c5564999c2545dd7f0ca230b239cc (diff)
downloadtor-9b09627edd2e1dcaed4ca8382bde3cf608ce6a81.tar.gz
tor-9b09627edd2e1dcaed4ca8382bde3cf608ce6a81.zip
Zero out some more key data before freeing it
Found by cypherpunks; fixes bug 2384.
-rw-r--r--changes/bug23845
-rw-r--r--src/common/crypto.c12
2 files changed, 14 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/changes/bug2384 b/changes/bug2384
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5321814424
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/bug2384
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+ o Minor bugfixes
+ - Zero out a few more keys in memory before freeing them. Fixes bug
+ 2384. Found by cypherpunks. Bugfix on 0.0.2pre9.
+
+
diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c
index 208e1c5fe1..29137a834d 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto.c
+++ b/src/common/crypto.c
@@ -490,6 +490,7 @@ crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(crypto_pk_env_t *env,
/* Try to parse it. */
r = crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(env, contents, -1);
+ memset(contents, 0, strlen(contents));
tor_free(contents);
if (r)
return -1; /* read_private_key_from_string already warned, so we don't.*/
@@ -627,6 +628,7 @@ crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(crypto_pk_env_t *env,
s[len]='\0';
r = write_str_to_file(fname, s, 0);
BIO_free(bio);
+ memset(s, 0, strlen(s));
tor_free(s);
return r;
}
@@ -1688,7 +1690,7 @@ crypto_dh_compute_secret(crypto_dh_env_t *dh,
{
char *secret_tmp = NULL;
BIGNUM *pubkey_bn = NULL;
- size_t secret_len=0;
+ size_t secret_len=0, secret_tmp_len=0;
int result=0;
tor_assert(dh);
tor_assert(secret_bytes_out/DIGEST_LEN <= 255);
@@ -1702,7 +1704,8 @@ crypto_dh_compute_secret(crypto_dh_env_t *dh,
log_warn(LD_CRYPTO,"Rejected invalid g^x");
goto error;
}
- secret_tmp = tor_malloc(crypto_dh_get_bytes(dh));
+ secret_tmp_len = crypto_dh_get_bytes(dh);
+ secret_tmp = tor_malloc(secret_tmp_len);
result = DH_compute_key((unsigned char*)secret_tmp, pubkey_bn, dh->dh);
if (result < 0) {
log_warn(LD_CRYPTO,"DH_compute_key() failed.");
@@ -1721,7 +1724,10 @@ crypto_dh_compute_secret(crypto_dh_env_t *dh,
crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "completing DH handshake");
if (pubkey_bn)
BN_free(pubkey_bn);
- tor_free(secret_tmp);
+ if (secret_tmp) {
+ memset(secret_tmp, 0, secret_tmp_len);
+ tor_free(secret_tmp);
+ }
if (result < 0)
return result;
else