summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorJacob Appelbaum <jacob@appelbaum.net>2009-04-21 07:55:07 +0000
committerJacob Appelbaum <jacob@appelbaum.net>2009-04-21 07:55:07 +0000
commitf33f2e95913f4d444bb469ed92dee0d2dd3f7575 (patch)
tree5d52cbbda6f2203e6cbda570597e5326af8816d1
parent7f4bfe5107b5e65c4c2531eed7d3cb52984bca4a (diff)
downloadtor-f33f2e95913f4d444bb469ed92dee0d2dd3f7575.tar.gz
tor-f33f2e95913f4d444bb469ed92dee0d2dd3f7575.zip
Update the port knocking SPA document to have more details. Still needs a packet filter.
svn:r19356
-rw-r--r--doc/spec/proposals/ideas/xxx-port-knocking.txt19
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/doc/spec/proposals/ideas/xxx-port-knocking.txt b/doc/spec/proposals/ideas/xxx-port-knocking.txt
index 04bbc7d453..9fbcdf3545 100644
--- a/doc/spec/proposals/ideas/xxx-port-knocking.txt
+++ b/doc/spec/proposals/ideas/xxx-port-knocking.txt
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ relay. Only authorized users should be able to communicate with the private
bridge. This should be done with Tor and if possible without the help of the
firewall. It should be possible for a Tor user to enter a secret key into
Tor or optionally Vidalia on a per bridge basis. This secret key should be
-used
+used to authenticate the bridge user to the private bridge.
1.x Issues with low ports and bind() for ORPort
@@ -71,6 +71,23 @@ will not trigger a response from Tor. With base32 encoding it should be
possible to encode SPA as valid DNS requests. This should allow use of the
public DNS infrastructure for authorization requests if desired.
+2.x Ghetto firewalling with opportunistic connection closing
+
+Until a user has authenticated with Tor, Tor only has a UDP listener. This
+listener should never send data in response, it should only open an ORPort
+when a user has successfully authenticated. After a user has authenticated
+with Tor to open an ORPort, only users who have authenticated will be able
+to use it. All other users as identified by their ip address will have their
+connection closed before any data is sent or received. This should be
+accomplished with an access policy. By default, the access policy should block
+all access to the ORPort.
+
+2.x Timing and reset of access policies
+
+Access to the ORPort is sensitive. The bridge should remove any exceptions
+to its access policy regularly when the ORPort is unused. Valid users should
+reauthenticate if they do not use the ORPort within a given time frame.
+
2.x Additional considerations
There are many. A format of the packet and the crypto involved is a good start.