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authorRoger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>2008-01-21 17:36:47 +0000
committerRoger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>2008-01-21 17:36:47 +0000
commite42a6794dc381a08b14fbecff95aef024a23ab1d (patch)
tree9183db66f4112bbfea6a0464a9a9fe079ea606aa
parent10ed49643e264b375df282269393666c87d30bdb (diff)
downloadtor-e42a6794dc381a08b14fbecff95aef024a23ab1d.tar.gz
tor-e42a6794dc381a08b14fbecff95aef024a23ab1d.zip
condense the rest of the discussion into proposal 129
svn:r13211
-rw-r--r--doc/spec/proposals/129-reject-plaintext-ports33
1 files changed, 29 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/doc/spec/proposals/129-reject-plaintext-ports b/doc/spec/proposals/129-reject-plaintext-ports
index d92b3a9331..425c9f14f5 100644
--- a/doc/spec/proposals/129-reject-plaintext-ports
+++ b/doc/spec/proposals/129-reject-plaintext-ports
@@ -1,11 +1,15 @@
-Below is a proposal to mitigate insecure protocol use over Tor.
-
+Filename: 129-reject-plaintext-ports.txt
Title: Block Insecure Protocols by Default
+Version: $Revision$
+Last-Modified: $Date$
Author: Kevin Bauer & Damon McCoy
-Date: January 15, 2008
+Created: 2008-01-15
+Status: Open
Overview:
+ Below is a proposal to mitigate insecure protocol use over Tor.
+
This document 1) demonstrates the extent to which insecure protocols are
currently used within the Tor network, and 2) proposes a simple solution
to prevent users from unknowingly using these insecure protocols. By
@@ -38,9 +42,14 @@ Motivation:
Security Implications:
- None. This proposal is intended to improve Tor's security by limiting the
+ This proposal is intended to improve Tor's security by limiting the
use of insecure protocols.
+ Roger added: By adding these warnings for only some of the risky
+ behavior, users may do other risky behavior, not get a warning, and
+ believe that it is therefore safe. But overall, I think it's better
+ to warn for some of it than to warn for none of it.
+
Specification:
As an initial step towards mitigating the use of the above-mentioned
@@ -88,3 +97,19 @@ References:
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/embassy_hacks.
Wired. September 10, 2007.
+Implementation:
+
+ Roger added this feature in
+ http://archives.seul.org/or/cvs/Jan-2008/msg00182.html
+ He also added a status event for Vidalia to recognize attempts to use
+ vulnerable-plaintext ports, so it can help the user understand what's
+ going on and how to fix it.
+
+Next steps:
+
+ a) Vidalia should learn to recognize this controller status event,
+ so we don't leave users out in the cold when we enable this feature.
+
+ b) We should decide which ports to reject by default. The current
+ consensus is 23,109,110,143 -- the same set that we warn for now.
+