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| author | Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> | 2007-02-24 05:54:34 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> | 2007-02-24 05:54:34 +0000 |
| commit | a5af49afc39fef581a79ca6d30aa64ba38858557 (patch) | |
| tree | a56247cdd99a42167d400ea0537ee10da6569154 | |
| parent | 748c502e3a9b11e1565c1f463fedd093e41b65e2 (diff) | |
| download | tor-a5af49afc39fef581a79ca6d30aa64ba38858557.tar.gz tor-a5af49afc39fef581a79ca6d30aa64ba38858557.zip | |
point out a problem from r9576
svn:r9631
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/spec/tor-spec.txt | 8 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/doc/spec/tor-spec.txt b/doc/spec/tor-spec.txt index 55e3ce03d7..c3aba0fd8d 100644 --- a/doc/spec/tor-spec.txt +++ b/doc/spec/tor-spec.txt @@ -175,8 +175,12 @@ see tor-design.pdf. the key is not as expected, the party must close the connection. All parties SHOULD reject connections to or from ORs that have malformed - or missing certificates. ORs SHOULD NOT reject incoming connections from - OPs with malformed or missing certificates. + or missing certificates. + [XXX How can we recognize that it's an OR if it's an incoming connection + with malformed/missing certs? Should we change the above to just "to + ORs"? -RD] + ORs SHOULD NOT reject incoming connections from OPs with malformed + or missing certificates. [Before version 0.1.2.8-rc, ORs rejected incoming connections from ORs and OPs alike if their certificates were missing or malformed.] |