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| author | Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> | 2006-08-27 07:03:05 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> | 2006-08-27 07:03:05 +0000 |
| commit | 20715027f7b3dc1e27686fe76cd73867db54a6a4 (patch) | |
| tree | 39828a58a4f1791e77377d4d3a3fce08a2fc71e8 | |
| parent | 0c8893aea756897ab30c1e8dbd2a4996a030225e (diff) | |
| download | tor-20715027f7b3dc1e27686fe76cd73867db54a6a4.tar.gz tor-20715027f7b3dc1e27686fe76cd73867db54a6a4.zip | |
fix typo
svn:r8243
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/incentives.txt | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/doc/incentives.txt b/doc/incentives.txt index 5b805549d1..994310025d 100644 --- a/doc/incentives.txt +++ b/doc/incentives.txt @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ Addendum: I was more thinking of measuring based on who is the service provider and service receiver for the circuit. Say Alice builds a circuit to Bob. Then Bob is providing service to Alice, since he - otherwise wouldn't need to spend is bandwidth. So traffic in either + otherwise wouldn't need to spend his bandwidth. So traffic in either direction should be charged to Alice. Of course, the same attack would work, namely, Bob could cheat by sending bytes back quickly. So someone close to the origin needs to detect this and close the circuit, if |