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author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2017-02-15 07:47:21 -0500 |
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committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2017-02-15 07:47:21 -0500 |
commit | ed806843dc8e7942a2a0abfbb2ae374e11963feb (patch) | |
tree | 3d3591b1db1c416661a74d9848794db8644b6146 | |
parent | 75fe218b166b4d4e46b50205104e9eeaa136e904 (diff) | |
parent | 3781f24b8014213c200f74973deb550382957a01 (diff) | |
download | tor-ed806843dc8e7942a2a0abfbb2ae374e11963feb.tar.gz tor-ed806843dc8e7942a2a0abfbb2ae374e11963feb.zip |
Merge branch 'maint-0.2.6' into maint-0.2.7
-rw-r--r-- | changes/bug20384 | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | changes/trove-2017-001.2 | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/routerparse.c | 49 |
3 files changed, 48 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/changes/bug20384 b/changes/bug20384 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..591015ad94 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug20384 @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ + o Major features (security fixes): + - Prevent a class of security bugs caused by treating the contents + of a buffer chunk as if they were a NUL-terminated string. At + least one such bug seems to be present in all currently used + versions of Tor, and would allow an attacker to remotely crash + most Tor instances, especially those compiled with extra compiler + hardening. With this defense in place, such bugs can't crash Tor, + though we should still fix them as they occur. Closes ticket + 20384 (TROVE-2016-10-001). + diff --git a/changes/trove-2017-001.2 b/changes/trove-2017-001.2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3ef073cf9f --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/trove-2017-001.2 @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + o Major bugfixes (parsing): + - Fix an integer underflow bug when comparing malformed Tor versions. + This bug is harmless, except when Tor has been built with + --enable-expensive-hardening, which would turn it into a crash; + or on Tor 0.2.9.1-alpha through Tor 0.2.9.8, which were built with + -ftrapv by default. + Part of TROVE-2017-001. Fixes bug 21278; bugfix on + 0.0.8pre1. Found by OSS-Fuzz. diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.c b/src/or/routerparse.c index 7804af934f..1a4dc114b6 100644 --- a/src/or/routerparse.c +++ b/src/or/routerparse.c @@ -4830,26 +4830,37 @@ tor_version_compare(tor_version_t *a, tor_version_t *b) int i; tor_assert(a); tor_assert(b); - if ((i = a->major - b->major)) - return i; - else if ((i = a->minor - b->minor)) - return i; - else if ((i = a->micro - b->micro)) - return i; - else if ((i = a->status - b->status)) - return i; - else if ((i = a->patchlevel - b->patchlevel)) - return i; - else if ((i = strcmp(a->status_tag, b->status_tag))) - return i; - else if ((i = a->svn_revision - b->svn_revision)) - return i; - else if ((i = a->git_tag_len - b->git_tag_len)) - return i; - else if (a->git_tag_len) - return fast_memcmp(a->git_tag, b->git_tag, a->git_tag_len); + + /* We take this approach to comparison to ensure the same (bogus!) behavior + * on all inputs as we would have seen before bug #21278 was fixed. The + * only important difference here is that this method doesn't cause + * a signed integer underflow. + */ +#define CMP(field) do { \ + unsigned aval = (unsigned) a->field; \ + unsigned bval = (unsigned) b->field; \ + int result = (int) (aval - bval); \ + if (result < 0) \ + return -1; \ + else if (result > 0) \ + return 1; \ + } while (0) + + CMP(major); + CMP(minor); + CMP(micro); + CMP(status); + CMP(patchlevel); + if ((i = strcmp(a->status_tag, b->status_tag))) + return i; + CMP(svn_revision); + CMP(git_tag_len); + if (a->git_tag_len) + return fast_memcmp(a->git_tag, b->git_tag, a->git_tag_len); else - return 0; + return 0; + +#undef CMP } /** Return true iff versions <b>a</b> and <b>b</b> belong to the same series. |