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author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2017-02-07 08:40:00 -0500 |
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committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2017-02-07 08:40:00 -0500 |
commit | 040d7cecf39c06ee705a97c90d546d34d6c115ab (patch) | |
tree | b3fec182b1a569b0b68181e023e0ee300b912506 | |
parent | d7810bb4a35cc0d0359b26856e1adeaf5c2bfdf8 (diff) | |
parent | 51675f97d30e48da68f2cf538f7f805f51af4c36 (diff) | |
download | tor-040d7cecf39c06ee705a97c90d546d34d6c115ab.tar.gz tor-040d7cecf39c06ee705a97c90d546d34d6c115ab.zip |
Merge branch 'maint-0.2.4' into release-0.2.4
-rw-r--r-- | changes/bug15823 | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | changes/bug17404 | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | changes/bug18089 | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/common/crypto.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/common/tortls.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/rendservice.c | 18 |
6 files changed, 44 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/changes/bug15823 b/changes/bug15823 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..987de5d9ac --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug15823 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (hidden service): + - Fix an out-of-bounds read when parsing invalid INTRODUCE2 cells + on a client authorized hidden service. Fixes bug 15823; bugfix + on 0.2.1.6-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug17404 b/changes/bug17404 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d524f6662d --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug17404 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Major bugfixes (security, correctness): + - Fix a programming error that could cause us to read 4 bytes before + the beginning of an openssl string. This could be used to provoke + a crash on systems with an unusual malloc implementation, or + systems with unsual hardening installed. Fixes bug 17404; bugfix + on 0.2.3.6-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug18089 b/changes/bug18089 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c1fb342f77 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug18089 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Minor fixes (security): + - Make memwipe() do nothing when passed a NULL pointer + or zero size. Check size argument to memwipe() for underflow. + Closes bug #18089. Reported by "gk", patch by "teor". + Bugfix on 0.2.3.25 and 0.2.4.6-alpha (#7352), + commit 49dd5ef3 on 7 Nov 2012. diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 925beb3529..522c1375c9 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -2972,6 +2972,7 @@ secret_to_key(char *key_out, size_t key_out_len, const char *secret, /** * Destroy the <b>sz</b> bytes of data stored at <b>mem</b>, setting them to * the value <b>byte</b>. + * If <b>mem</b> is NULL or <b>sz</b> is zero, nothing happens. * * This function is preferable to memset, since many compilers will happily * optimize out memset() when they can convince themselves that the data being @@ -2989,6 +2990,15 @@ secret_to_key(char *key_out, size_t key_out_len, const char *secret, void memwipe(void *mem, uint8_t byte, size_t sz) { + if (sz == 0) { + return; + } + /* If sz is nonzero, then mem must not be NULL. */ + tor_assert(mem != NULL); + + /* Data this large is likely to be an underflow. */ + tor_assert(sz < SIZE_T_CEILING); + /* Because whole-program-optimization exists, we may not be able to just * have this function call "memset". A smart compiler could inline it, then * eliminate dead memsets, and declare itself to be clever. */ diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index 4222f6dbff..840b677cb7 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -2676,6 +2676,10 @@ dn_indicates_v3_cert(X509_NAME *name) len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&s, str); if (len < 0) return 0; + if (len < 4) { + OPENSSL_free(s); + return 1; + } r = fast_memneq(s + len - 4, ".net", 4); OPENSSL_free(s); return r; diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 436f2f4b69..0a54567393 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -939,11 +939,13 @@ rend_service_requires_uptime(rend_service_t *service) return 0; } -/** Check client authorization of a given <b>descriptor_cookie</b> for - * <b>service</b>. Return 1 for success and 0 for failure. */ +/** Check client authorization of a given <b>descriptor_cookie</b> of + * length <b>cookie_len</b> for <b>service</b>. Return 1 for success + * and 0 for failure. */ static int rend_check_authorization(rend_service_t *service, - const char *descriptor_cookie) + const char *descriptor_cookie, + size_t cookie_len) { rend_authorized_client_t *auth_client = NULL; tor_assert(service); @@ -954,6 +956,13 @@ rend_check_authorization(rend_service_t *service, return 0; } + if (cookie_len != REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN) { + log_info(LD_REND, "Descriptor cookie is %lu bytes, but we expected " + "%lu bytes. Dropping cell.", + (unsigned long)cookie_len, (unsigned long)REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN); + return 0; + } + /* Look up client authorization by descriptor cookie. */ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->clients, rend_authorized_client_t *, client, { if (tor_memeq(client->descriptor_cookie, descriptor_cookie, @@ -1300,7 +1309,8 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, if (service->clients) { if (parsed_req->version == 3 && parsed_req->u.v3.auth_len > 0) { if (rend_check_authorization(service, - (const char*)parsed_req->u.v3.auth_data)) { + (const char*)parsed_req->u.v3.auth_data, + parsed_req->u.v3.auth_len)) { log_info(LD_REND, "Authorization data in INTRODUCE2 cell are valid."); } else { log_info(LD_REND, "The authorization data that are contained in " |