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author | Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> | 2006-02-09 03:44:13 +0000 |
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committer | Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> | 2006-02-09 03:44:13 +0000 |
commit | e106c5a246f75d1b4868b40309c3be4d53f5c2c9 (patch) | |
tree | 21261a9ef28f4f0ab96d09d70854d1588ee3c40f | |
parent | c0aa77d7e7d66fa508642a79a5a8ddf1c2603677 (diff) | |
download | tor-e106c5a246f75d1b4868b40309c3be4d53f5c2c9.tar.gz tor-e106c5a246f75d1b4868b40309c3be4d53f5c2c9.zip |
checkpoint some more notes on incentives
svn:r5939
-rw-r--r-- | doc/incentives.txt | 27 |
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/doc/incentives.txt b/doc/incentives.txt index 82dcae0336..a6623d72bd 100644 --- a/doc/incentives.txt +++ b/doc/incentives.txt @@ -152,6 +152,29 @@ maybe it's an argument in favor of a more penny-counting reputation approach. +3.7. What is the appropriate resource balance for servers vs. clients? + + If we build a good incentive system, we'll still need to tune it + to provide the right bandwidth allocation -- if we reserve too much + bandwidth for fast servers, then we're wasting some potential, but we + if we reserve too little, then fewer people will opt to become servers. + How do we find the right balance? + + One answer is that it doesn't have to be perfect: we can err on the + side of providing extra resources to servers, then we will achieve our + desired goal: when people complain about speed, we can tell them to + run a server, and they will in fact get better performance. In fact, + finding an optimum balance is especially hard because it's a moving + target: the better our incentive mechanism (and the lower the barrier + to setup), the more servers there will be. + +3.8. Anonymity attack: fast connections probably come from good servers. + + +3.9. How do we allocate bandwidth over the course of a second? + + + 4. Sample designs. 4.1. Two classes of service for circuits. @@ -220,7 +243,7 @@ we know that we can get away with poor performance for people that aren't listed in the directory. -5. Types of attacks. +5. Recommendations and next steps. + -5.1. Anonymity attacks: |