Merge remote-tracking branch 'dgoulet/bug27550_033_01' into maint-0.3.3

4 files changed, 12 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/changes/ticket27550 b/changes/ticket27550
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..87f9b5cbe9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/ticket27550
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+  o Minor bugfixes (hidden service v3):
+    - Don't warn so loudly when tor is unable to decode a descriptor. This can
+      now happen as a normal use case if a client gets a descriptor with
+      client authorization but the client is not authorized. Fixes bug 27550;
+      bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha.
diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c
index 8636f68410..ddb86cd9a4 100644
--- a/src/or/directory.c
+++ b/src/or/directory.c
@@ -3091,7 +3091,7 @@ handle_response_fetch_hsdesc_v3(dir_connection_t *conn,
   case 200:
     /* We got something: Try storing it in the cache. */
     if (hs_cache_store_as_client(body, &conn->hs_ident->identity_pk) < 0) {
-      log_warn(LD_REND, "Failed to store hidden service descriptor");
+      log_info(LD_REND, "Failed to store hidden service descriptor");
       /* Fire control port FAILED event. */
       hs_control_desc_event_failed(conn->hs_ident, conn->identity_digest,
                                    "BAD_DESC");
diff --git a/src/or/hs_client.c b/src/or/hs_client.c
index 0cfdec1907..77cbc11a89 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_client.c
+++ b/src/or/hs_client.c
@@ -1225,10 +1225,6 @@ hs_client_decode_descriptor(const char *desc_str,
   ret = hs_desc_decode_descriptor(desc_str, subcredential, desc);
   memwipe(subcredential, 0, sizeof(subcredential));
   if (ret < 0) {
-    log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Could not parse received descriptor as client.");
-    if (get_options()->SafeLogging_ == SAFELOG_SCRUB_NONE) {
-      log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "%s", escaped(desc_str));
-    }
     goto err;
   }
 
diff --git a/src/or/hs_descriptor.c b/src/or/hs_descriptor.c
index 0298c37322..32278ec9f2 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_descriptor.c
+++ b/src/or/hs_descriptor.c
@@ -1361,7 +1361,7 @@ decrypt_desc_layer,(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
    * This is a critical check that is making sure the computed MAC matches the
    * one in the descriptor. */
   if (!tor_memeq(our_mac, desc_mac, sizeof(our_mac))) {
-    log_warn(LD_REND, "Encrypted service descriptor MAC check failed");
+    log_info(LD_REND, "Encrypted service descriptor MAC check failed");
     goto err;
   }
 
@@ -1544,7 +1544,6 @@ desc_decrypt_all(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, char **decrypted_out)
                                         superencrypted_len,
                                         &encrypted_blob);
   if (!encrypted_len) {
-    log_warn(LD_REND, "Decrypting encrypted desc failed.");
     goto err;
   }
   tor_assert(encrypted_blob);
@@ -2046,7 +2045,11 @@ desc_decode_encrypted_v3(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
    * in the descriptor as a blob of bytes. */
   message_len = desc_decrypt_all(desc, &message);
   if (!message_len) {
-    log_warn(LD_REND, "Service descriptor decryption failed.");
+    /* Inform at notice level that the onion address requested can't be
+     * reached without client authorization most likely. */
+    log_notice(LD_REND, "Fail to decrypt descriptor for requested onion "
+                        "address. It is likely requiring client "
+                        "authorization.");
     goto err;
   }
   tor_assert(message);