diff options
author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2016-12-20 18:23:19 -0500 |
---|---|---|
committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2016-12-20 18:23:19 -0500 |
commit | 2673b4b7a87bbdc880dd235f490dfb7b8f3c64c9 (patch) | |
tree | f56513e810222c8dd1af0c6015b6b5b0a37de642 | |
parent | a9c8a5ff18c1944ddcea0116419edc2f199583b8 (diff) | |
parent | b6227edae1d8318b694029800a26e17a2a960af5 (diff) | |
download | tor-2673b4b7a87bbdc880dd235f490dfb7b8f3c64c9.tar.gz tor-2673b4b7a87bbdc880dd235f490dfb7b8f3c64c9.zip |
Merge branch 'maint-0.2.6' into maint-0.2.7
-rw-r--r-- | changes/buf-sentinel | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/buffers.c | 40 |
2 files changed, 43 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/changes/buf-sentinel b/changes/buf-sentinel new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7c5b829c19 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/buf-sentinel @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ + o Major features (security fixes): + + - Prevent a class of security bugs caused by treating the contents + of a buffer chunk as if they were a NUL-terminated string. At + least one such bug seems to be present in all currently used + versions of Tor, and would allow an attacker to remotely crash + most Tor instances, especially those compiled with extra compiler + hardening. With this defense in place, such bugs can't crash Tor, + though we should still fix them as they occur. Closes ticket 20384 + (TROVE-2016-10-001). + diff --git a/src/or/buffers.c b/src/or/buffers.c index cc2f6f409b..0e30bb8376 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.c +++ b/src/or/buffers.c @@ -69,12 +69,33 @@ static int parse_socks_client(const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen, #define CHUNK_HEADER_LEN STRUCT_OFFSET(chunk_t, mem[0]) +/* We leave this many NUL bytes at the end of the buffer. */ +#define SENTINEL_LEN 4 + +/* Header size plus NUL bytes at the end */ +#define CHUNK_OVERHEAD (CHUNK_HEADER_LEN + SENTINEL_LEN) + /** Return the number of bytes needed to allocate a chunk to hold * <b>memlen</b> bytes. */ -#define CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(memlen) (CHUNK_HEADER_LEN + (memlen)) +#define CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(memlen) (CHUNK_OVERHEAD + (memlen)) /** Return the number of usable bytes in a chunk allocated with * malloc(<b>memlen</b>). */ -#define CHUNK_SIZE_WITH_ALLOC(memlen) ((memlen) - CHUNK_HEADER_LEN) +#define CHUNK_SIZE_WITH_ALLOC(memlen) ((memlen) - CHUNK_OVERHEAD) + +#define DEBUG_SENTINEL + +#ifdef DEBUG_SENTINEL +#define DBG_S(s) s +#else +#define DBG_S(s) (void)0 +#endif + +#define CHUNK_SET_SENTINEL(chunk, alloclen) do { \ + uint8_t *a = (uint8_t*) &(chunk)->mem[(chunk)->memlen]; \ + DBG_S(uint8_t *b = &((uint8_t*)(chunk))[(alloclen)-SENTINEL_LEN]); \ + DBG_S(tor_assert(a == b)); \ + memset(a,0,SENTINEL_LEN); \ + } while (0) /** Return the next character in <b>chunk</b> onto which data can be appended. * If the chunk is full, this might be off the end of chunk->mem. */ @@ -131,6 +152,7 @@ chunk_new_with_alloc_size(size_t alloc) ch->memlen = CHUNK_SIZE_WITH_ALLOC(alloc); total_bytes_allocated_in_chunks += alloc; ch->data = &ch->mem[0]; + CHUNK_SET_SENTINEL(ch, alloc); return ch; } @@ -140,18 +162,20 @@ static INLINE chunk_t * chunk_grow(chunk_t *chunk, size_t sz) { off_t offset; - size_t memlen_orig = chunk->memlen; + const size_t memlen_orig = chunk->memlen; + const size_t orig_alloc = CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(memlen_orig); + const size_t new_alloc = CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(sz); tor_assert(sz > chunk->memlen); offset = chunk->data - chunk->mem; - chunk = tor_realloc(chunk, CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(sz)); + chunk = tor_realloc(chunk, new_alloc); chunk->memlen = sz; chunk->data = chunk->mem + offset; #ifdef DEBUG_CHUNK_ALLOC - tor_assert(chunk->DBG_alloc == CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(memlen_orig)); - chunk->DBG_alloc = CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(sz); + tor_assert(chunk->DBG_alloc == orig_alloc); + chunk->DBG_alloc = new_alloc; #endif - total_bytes_allocated_in_chunks += - CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(sz) - CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(memlen_orig); + total_bytes_allocated_in_chunks += new_alloc - orig_alloc; + CHUNK_SET_SENTINEL(chunk, new_alloc); return chunk; } |