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| author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2012-01-04 21:17:52 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2012-01-05 12:28:55 -0500 |
| commit | 0a00678e56ec3030b9028a7188f68ab6c10a3fa3 (patch) | |
| tree | c9770404105cbdec070bcc465acec0b862184cd5 | |
| parent | db78fe45898a6d03727f8db68642bfebdfc10bf8 (diff) | |
| download | tor-0a00678e56ec3030b9028a7188f68ab6c10a3fa3.tar.gz tor-0a00678e56ec3030b9028a7188f68ab6c10a3fa3.zip | |
Add a changes file for bug4822
| -rw-r--r-- | changes/bug4822 | 13 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/changes/bug4822 b/changes/bug4822 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..73f43f0452 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug4822 @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ + o Major security workaround: + - When building or running with any version of OpenSSL earlier + than 0.9.8s or 1.0.0f, disable SSLv3 support. These versions had + a bug (CVE-2011-4576) in which their block cipher padding + included uninitialized data, potentially leaking sensitive + information to any peer with whom they made a SSLv3 + connection. Tor does not use SSL v3 by default, but a hostile + client or server could force an SSLv3 connection in order to + gain information that they shouldn't have been able to get. The + best solution here is to upgrade to OpenSSL 0.9.8s or 1.0.0f (or + later). But when building or running with a non-upgraded + OpenSSL, we should instead make sure that the bug can't happen + by disabling SSLv3 entirely. |