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authorRoger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>2004-07-22 07:34:03 +0000
committerRoger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>2004-07-22 07:34:03 +0000
commita7d16e38eb19e668dca9acdc0cde08a1f673844a (patch)
treeadc5508f5c5997ea36e678c7f9078c85888600bf
parentf355a9c9f1969dd0cce9d1772483df81431e280b (diff)
downloadtor-a7d16e38eb19e668dca9acdc0cde08a1f673844a.tar.gz
tor-a7d16e38eb19e668dca9acdc0cde08a1f673844a.zip
mark off todo items; add todo items; correct tor-spec.txt
svn:r2101
-rw-r--r--doc/TODO13
-rw-r--r--doc/tor-spec.txt21
2 files changed, 18 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/doc/TODO b/doc/TODO
index 1e4b23dfdd..64147afae1 100644
--- a/doc/TODO
+++ b/doc/TODO
@@ -105,10 +105,10 @@ NICK - Reputation info needs to give better weight to recent events than
- and working
for pre1:
- - 0.0.8 ORs should use identity key for 0.0.7 ORs sometimes but
+ o 0.0.8 ORs should use identity key for 0.0.7 ORs sometimes but
not always?
- - we should publish advertised_bandwidth in descriptor
- - bug: 0.0.8 OPs can't extend from an 0.0.7 OR to an 0.0.8 OR
+ o we should publish advertised_bandwidth in descriptor
+ o bug: 0.0.8 OPs can't extend from an 0.0.7 OR to an 0.0.8 OR
post pre1:
- when we sigint tor, the dns/cpuworkers don't intercept sigint?
@@ -117,6 +117,13 @@ NICK - Reputation info needs to give better weight to recent events than
- ORs use uniquer default nicknames
- Tors deal appropriately when a newly-verified router has the
same nickname as another router they know about
+ X 007 can't extend to unverified 008. they will never be able to.
+ - if a begin failed due to exit policy, but we believe the IP
+ should have been allowed, switch that router to exitpolicy
+ reject *:* until we get our next directory.
+ - make advertised_server_mode() ORs fetch dirs more often.
+ - should the running-routers list put unverified routers at the
+ end?
ongoing:
diff --git a/doc/tor-spec.txt b/doc/tor-spec.txt
index ec543cc72f..522cf24e13 100644
--- a/doc/tor-spec.txt
+++ b/doc/tor-spec.txt
@@ -11,10 +11,6 @@ This is not a design document; most design criteria are not examined. For
more information on why Tor acts as it does, see tor-design.pdf.
TODO: (very soon)
- X EXTEND cells should have hostnames or nicknames, so that OPs never
- resolve OR hostnames. Else DNS servers can give different answers to
- different OPs, and compromise their anonymity.
- - Alternatively, directories should include IPs.
- REASON_CONNECTFAILED should include an IP.
- Copy prose from tor-design to make everything more readable.
@@ -68,8 +64,8 @@ TODO: (very soon)
support any suite without ephemeral keys, symmetric keys of at
least 128 bits, and digests of at least 160 bits.
- An OR always sends two-certificate chain, consisting of a self-signed
- certificate containing the OR's identity key, and of a second certificate
+ An OR always sends a two-certificate chain, consisting of a self-signed
+ certificate containing the OR's identity key, and a second certificate
using a short-term connection key. The commonName of the second
certificate is the OR's nickname, and the commonName of the first
certificate is the OR's nickname, followed by a space and the string
@@ -79,8 +75,7 @@ TODO: (very soon)
as expected. (When initiating a connection, the expected identity key is
the one given in the directory; when creating a connection because of an
EXTEND cell, the expected identity key is the one given in the cell.) If
- the key is not as expected, the party must close the connection if it is
- not.
+ the key is not as expected, the party must close the connection.
Once a TLS connection is established, the two sides send cells
(specified below) to one another. Cells are sent serially. All
@@ -175,18 +170,18 @@ TODO: (very soon)
The relay payload for an EXTEND relay cell consists of:
Address [4 bytes]
Port [2 bytes]
- Public key hash [20 bytes]
Onion skin [186 bytes]
+ Public key hash [20 bytes]
The port and address field denote the IPV4 address and port of the
next onion router in the circuit; the public key hash is the SHA1 hash of
the ASN1 encoding of the next onion router's identity key.
[XXXX Before 0.0.8, EXTEND cells did not include the public key hash.
- Servers running 0.0.8 distinguish the old-style cells based on the length
- of payloads. Clients running 0.0.8 check for servers version 0.0.7 or
- later, and send them the old-style EXTEND cells. In a future release,
- old-style EXTEND cells will not be supported.]
+ Servers running 0.0.8 distinguish the old-style cells based on the
+ length of payloads. (Servers running 0.0.7 blindly pass on the extend
+ cell regardless of length.) In a future release, old-style EXTEND
+ cells will not be supported.]
The payload for a CREATED cell, or the relay payload for an
EXTENDED cell, contains: