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On Windows, if an application is registered as an URL handler like this:
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT
https
URL Protocol = ""
[...]
shell
open
command
(Default) = ".../qutebrowser.exe" "%1"
one would think that Windows takes care of making sure URLs can't inject
arguments by containing a quote. However, this is not the case, as
stated by the Microsoft docs:
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/internet-explorer/ie-developer/platform-apis/aa767914(v=vs.85)
Security Warning: Applications that handle URI schemes must consider how to
respond to malicious data. Because handler applications can receive data
from untrusted sources, the URI and other parameter values passed to the
application may contain malicious data that attempts to exploit the handling
application.
and
As noted above, the string that is passed to a pluggable protocol handler
might be broken across multiple parameters. Malicious parties could use
additional quote or backslash characters to pass additional command line
parameters. For this reason, pluggable protocol handlers should assume that
any parameters on the command line could come from malicious parties, and
carefully validate them. Applications that could initiate dangerous actions
based on external data must first confirm those actions with the user. In
addition, handling applications should be tested with URIs that are overly
long or contain unexpected (or undesirable) character sequences.
Indeed it's trivial to pass a command to qutebrowser this way - given how
trivial the exploit is to recreate given the information above, here's a PoC:
https:x" ":spawn calc
(or qutebrowserurl: instead of https: if qutebrowser isn't registered as a
default browser)
Some applications do escape the quote characters before calling
qutebrowser - but others, like Outlook Desktop or .url files, do not.
As a fix, we add an --untrusted-args flag and some early validation of the raw
sys.argv, before parsing any arguments or e.g. creating a QApplication (which
might already allow injecting Qt flags there).
We assume that there's no way for an attacker to inject flags *before* the %1
placeholder in the registry, and add --untrusted-args as the last argument of
the registry entry. This way, it'd still be possible for users to customize
their invocation flags without having to remove --untrusted-args.
After --untrusted-args, however, we have some rather strict checks:
- There should be zero or one arguments, but not two (or more)
- Any argument may not start with - (flag) or : (qutebrowser command)
We also add the --untrusted-args flag to the Linux .desktop file, though it
should not be needed there, as the specification there is sane:
https://specifications.freedesktop.org/desktop-entry-spec/desktop-entry-spec-latest.html#exec-variables
Implementations must take care not to expand field codes into multiple
arguments unless explicitly instructed by this specification. This means
that name fields, filenames and other replacements that can contain spaces
must be passed as a single argument to the executable program after
expansion.
There is no comparable mechanism on macOS, which opens the application without
arguments and then sends an "open" event to it:
https://doc.qt.io/qt-5/qfileopenevent.html
This issue was introduced in qutebrowser v1.7.0 which started registering it as
URL handler: baee2888907b260881d5831c68500941937261a0 / #4086
This is by no means an issue isolated to qutebrowser. Many other projects have
had similar trouble with Windows' rather unexpected behavior:
Electron / Exodus Bitcoin wallet:
- http://web.archive.org/web/20190702112128/https://medium.com/0xcc/electrons-bug-shellexecute-to-blame-cacb433d0d62
- https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-1000006
- https://medium.com/hackernoon/exploiting-electron-rce-in-exodus-wallet-d9e6db13c374
IE/Firefox:
- https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=384384
- https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1572838
Others:
- http://web.archive.org/web/20210930203632/https://www.vdoo.com/blog/exploiting-custom-protocol-handlers-in-windows
- https://parsiya.net/blog/2021-03-17-attack-surface-analysis-part-2-custom-protocol-handlers/
- etc. etc.
See CVE-2021-41146 / GHSA-vw27-fwjf-5qxm:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-41146
https://github.com/qutebrowser/qutebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-vw27-fwjf-5qxm
Thanks to Ping Fan (Zetta) Ke of Valkyrie-X Security Research Group
(VXRL/@vxresearch) for finding and responsibly disclosing this issue.
(cherry picked from commit 8f46ba3f6dc7b18375f7aa63c48a1fe461190430)
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Fixes #6489
(cherry picked from commit b4b65b8cd158aecea11e7d074d941f8c3908ab66)
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(cherry picked from commit c74d1075620f54d8904b9ae822299ba1221450f4)
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Also needed to add encoding check support to FormatString.
(cherry picked from commit 996487c43e4fcc265b541f9eca1e7930e3c5cf05)
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(cherry picked from commit 03fa9383833c6262b08a5f7c4930143e39327173)
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(cherry picked from commit 33596cfa4abb70df87551600d4c1eeb79a27c106)
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We need to set XDG_RUNTIME_DIR properly in the tests so that the log is empty.
(cherry picked from commit 1830f784df18057f5e07a59256cc73b5fea91a86)
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Fixes #6482
(cherry picked from commit 40477e826c9ec73a8f99177df645094be3ef5ed3)
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(cherry picked from commit 7961cf73553847ea265a388b736fffac77dae66a)
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2c4bb064e introduced support for showing bindings in the completion menu
for commands initiated with set-cmd-text. This would crash if given a
binding for just 'set-cmd-text' with no args.
Fixes #6453.
(cherry picked from commit a36efcf6b5b08666c2a65f8d2eef90eaba832fe6)
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See https://bugreports.qt.io/browse/QTBUG-93744
(cherry picked from commit b03b03bdf6e02e13b348689bf7b18196432f232b)
Additional fixups:
Store initial QtWebEngine version
(cherry picked from commit 948fd5040d81228452fd72a0170a0d8fe35839a9)
Fix state config unit tests
(cherry picked from commit 335ed484c1f8b6e5417d9000ae226b4f9a85b28f)
Fix running without QtWebEngine
(cherry picked from commit 57ed85ffad3278d159d1ebd03081a5e719b952cb)
Remove unused imports
(cherry picked from commit 9e52ad621ac44d0391c2c6d9dbdda967f7ce95f0)
Fix tests without QtWebEngine
(cherry picked from commit ac12fcd714c699f927170b3d0508336940366bac)
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See https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/119376#issuecomment-820073044
(cherry picked from commit febb921040b6670d9b1694a6ce55ae39384d1306)
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(cherry picked from commit 32604a6651813e25ee6d328c880ef95f76c9c744)
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(cherry picked from commit 0ee169e497de97d13bbd1b0c50e11bd452d5d25f)
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Fixes #6407
(cherry picked from commit c7b3559d820ebdc8b3077fce3d782e6ab81cb732)
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The underlying Chromium pads images so that scanlines align on 4-byte
boundaries. Thus, with an image size of e.g. 239x239, we'll have 3 bytes
of padding (239 mod 4 = 3; 240 mod 4 = 0).
Fixes #6375
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This reverts commits 02a64630aa83e37e47a28a60366e1c65f0eba3ac to 4ff204aecc96d77209a18594a14da96af703c43f.
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https://bugs.python.org/issue40066
https://mail.python.org/archives/list/python-dev@python.org/message/CHQW6THTDYNPPFWQ2KDDTUYSAJDCZFNP/
https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/b775106d940e3d77c8af7967545bb9a5b7b162df
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We don't actually need those values anywhere, and parsing can be tricky
as there isn't a fixed format for those version numbers. Let's just not
do it at all. See #6354.
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Closes #6354
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See #5856
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Running :adblock-update also updates ABP lists and thus tries downloading easylist.
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It requires some time and network access, so no need to run it as part of the automated tests.
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They happen with data/crashers/webrtc.html in Flatpak and are harmless.
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Accidentally changed in 8a0d7a5be801b4d7370b97ad14715a7c9261226d
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Speculatively fixes #5344
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This reverts commit c6cf3067e158265096410afee98407826b19c472.
Seems to cause segfaults:
#0 0x00007ffff5cecbcc in void doActivate<false>(QObject*, int, void**) () from /home/florian/proj/qutebrowser/git/.tox/py39-pyqt515/lib/python3.9/site-packages/PyQt5/Qt5/lib/libQt5Core.so.5
#1 0x00007ffff5be4e31 in QIODevice::channelReadyRead(int) () from /home/florian/proj/qutebrowser/git/.tox/py39-pyqt515/lib/python3.9/site-packages/PyQt5/Qt5/lib/libQt5Core.so.5
#2 0x00007fffeffccb54 in QAbstractSocketPrivate::canReadNotification() () from /home/florian/proj/qutebrowser/git/.tox/py39-pyqt515/lib/python3.9/site-packages/PyQt5/Qt5/lib/libQt5Network.so.5
#3 0x00007fffeffdf061 in QReadNotifier::event(QEvent*) () from /home/florian/proj/qutebrowser/git/.tox/py39-pyqt515/lib/python3.9/site-packages/PyQt5/Qt5/lib/libQt5Network.so.5
#4 0x00007ffff269e43c in QApplicationPrivate::notify_helper(QObject*, QEvent*) () from /home/florian/proj/qutebrowser/git/.tox/py39-pyqt515/lib/python3.9/site-packages/PyQt5/Qt5/lib/libQt5Widgets.so.5
#5 0x00007ffff26a4f20 in QApplication::notify(QObject*, QEvent*) () from /home/florian/proj/qutebrowser/git/.tox/py39-pyqt515/lib/python3.9/site-packages/PyQt5/Qt5/lib/libQt5Widgets.so.5
#6 0x00007ffff318d0d6 in sipQApplication::notify(QObject*, QEvent*) () from /home/florian/proj/qutebrowser/git/.tox/py39-pyqt515/lib/python3.9/site-packages/PyQt5/QtWidgets.abi3.so
#7 0x00007ffff5cb4808 in QCoreApplication::notifyInternal2(QObject*, QEvent*) () from /home/florian/proj/qutebrowser/git/.tox/py39-pyqt515/lib/python3.9/site-packages/PyQt5/Qt5/lib/libQt5Core.so.5
#8 0x00007ffff5d10d98 in socketNotifierSourceDispatch(_GSource*, int (*)(void*), void*) () from /home/florian/proj/qutebrowser/git/.tox/py39-pyqt515/lib/python3.9/site-packages/PyQt5/Qt5/lib/libQt5Core.so.5
#9 0x00007ffff691df9c in g_main_context_dispatch () from /usr/lib/libglib-2.0.so.0
#10 0x00007ffff6971a49 in ?? () from /usr/lib/libglib-2.0.so.0
#11 0x00007ffff691b6f1 in g_main_context_iteration () from /usr/lib/libglib-2.0.so.0
#12 0x00007ffff5d101cc in QEventDispatcherGlib::processEvents(QFlags<QEventLoop::ProcessEventsFlag>) () from /home/florian/proj/qutebrowser/git/.tox/py39-pyqt515/lib/python3.9/site-packages/PyQt5/Qt5/lib/libQt5Core.so.5
#13 0x00007ffff5cb321a in QEventLoop::exec(QFlags<QEventLoop::ProcessEventsFlag>) () from /home/florian/proj/qutebrowser/git/.tox/py39-pyqt515/lib/python3.9/site-packages/PyQt5/Qt5/lib/libQt5Core.so.5
#14 0x00007ffff5cbc1d3 in QCoreApplication::exec() () from /home/florian/proj/qutebrowser/git/.tox/py39-pyqt515/lib/python3.9/site-packages/PyQt5/Qt5/lib/libQt5Core.so.5
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Seems to cause more trouble than it solves nowadays.
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