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(cherry picked from commit 41b05f954882313131a75ccbc53c1e373a915d38)
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On Windows, if an application is registered as an URL handler like this:
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT
https
URL Protocol = ""
[...]
shell
open
command
(Default) = ".../qutebrowser.exe" "%1"
one would think that Windows takes care of making sure URLs can't inject
arguments by containing a quote. However, this is not the case, as
stated by the Microsoft docs:
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/internet-explorer/ie-developer/platform-apis/aa767914(v=vs.85)
Security Warning: Applications that handle URI schemes must consider how to
respond to malicious data. Because handler applications can receive data
from untrusted sources, the URI and other parameter values passed to the
application may contain malicious data that attempts to exploit the handling
application.
and
As noted above, the string that is passed to a pluggable protocol handler
might be broken across multiple parameters. Malicious parties could use
additional quote or backslash characters to pass additional command line
parameters. For this reason, pluggable protocol handlers should assume that
any parameters on the command line could come from malicious parties, and
carefully validate them. Applications that could initiate dangerous actions
based on external data must first confirm those actions with the user. In
addition, handling applications should be tested with URIs that are overly
long or contain unexpected (or undesirable) character sequences.
Indeed it's trivial to pass a command to qutebrowser this way - given how
trivial the exploit is to recreate given the information above, here's a PoC:
https:x" ":spawn calc
(or qutebrowserurl: instead of https: if qutebrowser isn't registered as a
default browser)
Some applications do escape the quote characters before calling
qutebrowser - but others, like Outlook Desktop or .url files, do not.
As a fix, we add an --untrusted-args flag and some early validation of the raw
sys.argv, before parsing any arguments or e.g. creating a QApplication (which
might already allow injecting Qt flags there).
We assume that there's no way for an attacker to inject flags *before* the %1
placeholder in the registry, and add --untrusted-args as the last argument of
the registry entry. This way, it'd still be possible for users to customize
their invocation flags without having to remove --untrusted-args.
After --untrusted-args, however, we have some rather strict checks:
- There should be zero or one arguments, but not two (or more)
- Any argument may not start with - (flag) or : (qutebrowser command)
We also add the --untrusted-args flag to the Linux .desktop file, though it
should not be needed there, as the specification there is sane:
https://specifications.freedesktop.org/desktop-entry-spec/desktop-entry-spec-latest.html#exec-variables
Implementations must take care not to expand field codes into multiple
arguments unless explicitly instructed by this specification. This means
that name fields, filenames and other replacements that can contain spaces
must be passed as a single argument to the executable program after
expansion.
There is no comparable mechanism on macOS, which opens the application without
arguments and then sends an "open" event to it:
https://doc.qt.io/qt-5/qfileopenevent.html
This issue was introduced in qutebrowser v1.7.0 which started registering it as
URL handler: baee2888907b260881d5831c68500941937261a0 / #4086
This is by no means an issue isolated to qutebrowser. Many other projects have
had similar trouble with Windows' rather unexpected behavior:
Electron / Exodus Bitcoin wallet:
- http://web.archive.org/web/20190702112128/https://medium.com/0xcc/electrons-bug-shellexecute-to-blame-cacb433d0d62
- https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-1000006
- https://medium.com/hackernoon/exploiting-electron-rce-in-exodus-wallet-d9e6db13c374
IE/Firefox:
- https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=384384
- https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1572838
Others:
- http://web.archive.org/web/20210930203632/https://www.vdoo.com/blog/exploiting-custom-protocol-handlers-in-windows
- https://parsiya.net/blog/2021-03-17-attack-surface-analysis-part-2-custom-protocol-handlers/
- etc. etc.
See CVE-2021-41146 / GHSA-vw27-fwjf-5qxm:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-41146
https://github.com/qutebrowser/qutebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-vw27-fwjf-5qxm
Thanks to Ping Fan (Zetta) Ke of Valkyrie-X Security Research Group
(VXRL/@vxresearch) for finding and responsibly disclosing this issue.
(cherry picked from commit 8f46ba3f6dc7b18375f7aa63c48a1fe461190430)
# Conflicts:
# qutebrowser/qutebrowser.py
# tests/unit/test_qutebrowser.py
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See https://github.com/qutebrowser/qutebrowser/issues/5237#issuecomment-636845641
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See https://github.com/qutebrowser/qutebrowser/issues/5390#issuecomment-634062762
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See https://github.com/qutebrowser/qutebrowser/issues/5237#issuecomment-636845641
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This reverts commit 56404bc52c80f1ed01a53770e0ba66e1647fc34c.
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See https://github.com/qutebrowser/qutebrowser/issues/5237#issuecomment-636845641
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To get a less generic name.
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Also make it a bit clearer that using QtWebKit isn't the preferred solution to
those problems.
Fixes #5313
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This allows us to get the version string in addition to the vendor. We also
show that version string in the version info output.
See #5313
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Not needed anymore since 16d98a4137762dfb2731d8bc185549de721d3ca6 - for some
odd reason, the pylint failure only came up on CI now, and I don't see it
locally...
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Fixes #5472
See #4805, #4810
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If we chain two commands, the end2end test code will still only wait for
"command called: *" once. This causes all future waits to be "shifted" by one,
which can cause flaky tests on Windows.
All other usages of command chaining in tests actually *need* the second
command to run as soon as possible after the original one. However, for the
caret tests, we only need to run two commands, see
2b0870084b9185b8f8a12639d238c12b202d3284.
Because pytest-bdd doesn't allow us to re-use "Given" steps, and "Background:"
only accepts "Given", let's add a second "Given" step as an ugly but acceptable
hack. See https://github.com/pytest-dev/pytest-bdd/issues/157
See https://github.com/qutebrowser/qutebrowser/issues/5390#issuecomment-622885572
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This reverts commit ef3a4b00f0de7a2a2f5f013faa9e3df09611d60e.
Reverts #5469.
That misspelling is intentional (see context).
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See #5394
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See #5394
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Corrected "c.tabs.possition" typo
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possition -> position
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Closes #5394
See #2377
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If we have a filename available, let's add it to the error message.
This also effectively reverts 00747be9d3790534e8b32464605d1b5b6c2d6627 since
that's not needed anymore (Qt 5.7 is the oldest supported release).
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See #5359
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Also improve error handling in test_err_windows
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See https://github.com/qutebrowser/qutebrowser/issues/5390#issuecomment-631066927
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See https://github.com/qutebrowser/qutebrowser/issues/5390#issuecomment-622881094
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Scheduled weekly dependency update for week 21
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