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In the original BoringCrypto port, ecdsa and rsa's public and private
keys added a 'boring unsafe.Pointer' field to cache the BoringCrypto
form of the key. This led to problems with code that “knew” the layout
of those structs and in particular that they had no unexported fields.
In response, as an awful kludge, I changed the compiler to pretend
that field did not exist when laying out reflect data. Because we want
to merge BoringCrypto in the main tree, we need a different solution.
Using boring.Cache is that solution.
For #51940.
Change-Id: Ideb2b40b599a1dc223082eda35a5ea9abcc01e30
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/395883
Run-TryBot: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
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A plain make.bash in this tree will produce a working,
standard Go toolchain, not a BoringCrypto-enabled one.
The BoringCrypto-enabled one will be created with:
GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto ./make.bash
For #51940.
Change-Id: Ia9102ed993242eb1cb7f9b93eca97e81986a27b3
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/395881
Run-TryBot: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
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VerifyRSAPKCS1v15
This matches the new crypto/rsa behavior introduced in CL 226203.
Updates #21896
Change-Id: If04eeff933d7310c2baa0f8fd26907892c2397fd
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/227651
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
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Add a couple of skips for slow js/wasm tests.
Change-Id: Ic95256b1d3c6e5e2f0cc536fad51e914d31cda9e
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Now that the standard library behavior in reading from the randomness
source is not reliable thanks to randutil.MaybeReadByte, we don't need
to emulate its behavior.
Also, since boring.RandReader is never deterministic, add an early exit
to randutil.MaybeReadByte.
Change-Id: Ie53e45ee64af635595181f71abd3c4340c600907
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/117555
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
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All the finalizer-enabled C wrappers must be careful to use
runtime.KeepAlive to ensure the C wrapper object (a Go object)
lives through the end of every C call using state that the
wrapper's finalizer would free.
This CL makes the wrappers appropriately careful.
The test proves that this is the bug I was chasing in a
separate real program, and that the KeepAlives fix it.
I did not write a test of every possible operation.
Change-Id: I627007e480f16adf8396e7f796b54e5525d9ea80
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/64870
Run-TryBot: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
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Precomputed.CRTValues
This matches the standard GenerateKey and more importantly Precompute,
so that if you generate a key and then store it, read it back, call Precompute
on the new copy, and then do reflect.DeepEqual on the two copies, they
will match. Before this CL, the original key had CRTValues == nil and the
reconstituted key has CRTValues != nil (but len(CRTValues) == 0).
Change-Id: I1ddc64342a50a1b65a48d827e4d564f1faab1945
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/63914
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
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custom randomness
In routines like GenerateKey, where bits from the randomness source have a
visible effect on the output, we bypass BoringCrypto if given a non-standard
randomness source (and also assert that this happens only during tests).
In the decryption paths, the randomness source is only for blinding and has
no effect on the output, so we unconditionally invoke BoringCrypto, letting it
use its own randomness source as it sees fit. This in turn lets us verify that
the non-BoringCrypto decryption function is never called, not even in tests.
Unfortunately, while the randomness source has no visible effect on the
decrypt operation, the decrypt operation does have a visible effect on
the randomness source. If decryption doesn't use the randomness source,
and it's a synthetic stream, then a future operation will read a different
position in the stream and may produce different output. This happens
in tests more often than you'd hope.
To keep behavior of those future operations unchanged while still
ensuring that the original decrypt is never called, this CL adds a
simulation of the blinding preparation, to discard the right amount
from the random source before invoking BoringCrypto.
Change-Id: If2f87b856c811b59b536187c93efa99a97721419
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/63912
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
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signatures
The standard Go crypto/rsa allows signatures to be shorter
than the RSA modulus and assumes leading zeros.
BoringCrypto does not, so supply the leading zeros explicitly.
This fixes the golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp tests.
Change-Id: Ic8b18d6beb0e02992a0474f5fdb2b73ccf7098cf
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/62170
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
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This is terrible but much simpler, cleaner, and more effective
than all the alternatives I have come up with.
Lots of code assumes that reflect.DeepEqual is meaningful
on rsa.PublicKey etc, because previously they consisted only of
exported meaningful fields.
Worse, there exists code that assumes asn1.Marshal can be
passed an rsa.PublicKey, because that struct has historically
matched exactly the form that would be needed to produce
the official ASN.1 DER encoding of an RSA public key.
Instead of tracking down and fixing all of that code
(and probably more), we can limit the BoringCrypto-induced
damage by ensliting the compiler to hide the new field
from reflection. Then nothing can get at it and nothing can
be disrupted by it.
Kill two birds with one cannon ball.
I'm very sorry.
Change-Id: I0ca4d6047c7e98f880cbb81904048c1952e278cc
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/60271
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
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