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authorFilippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>2019-09-12 12:37:36 -0400
committerDmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@golang.org>2019-09-26 16:43:06 +0000
commit41b1f88efab9d263408448bf139659119002ea50 (patch)
tree3cfee22c40231f7eaa8b6b2b9794d5be3fe66a6b /src/net/http/transport_test.go
parent0ad368675bae1e3228c9146e092cd00cfb29ac27 (diff)
downloadgo-41b1f88efab9d263408448bf139659119002ea50.tar.gz
go-41b1f88efab9d263408448bf139659119002ea50.zip
net/textproto: don't normalize headers with spaces before the colon
RFC 7230 is clear about headers with a space before the colon, like X-Answer : 42 being invalid, but we've been accepting and normalizing them for compatibility purposes since CL 5690059 in 2012. On the client side, this is harmless and indeed most browsers behave the same to this day. On the server side, this becomes a security issue when the behavior doesn't match that of a reverse proxy sitting in front of the server. For example, if a WAF accepts them without normalizing them, it might be possible to bypass its filters, because the Go server would interpret the header differently. Worse, if the reverse proxy coalesces requests onto a single HTTP/1.1 connection to a Go server, the understanding of the request boundaries can get out of sync between them, allowing an attacker to tack an arbitrary method and path onto a request by other clients, including authentication headers unknown to the attacker. This was recently presented at multiple security conferences: https://portswigger.net/blog/http-desync-attacks-request-smuggling-reborn net/http servers already reject header keys with invalid characters. Simply stop normalizing extra spaces in net/textproto, let it return them unchanged like it does for other invalid headers, and let net/http enforce RFC 7230, which is HTTP specific. This loses us normalization on the client side, but there's no right answer on the client side anyway, and hiding the issue sounds worse than letting the application decide. Fixes CVE-2019-16276 Fixes #34540 Change-Id: I6d272de827e0870da85d93df770d6a0e161bbcf1 Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/549719 Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/197503 Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@golang.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/net/http/transport_test.go')
-rw-r--r--src/net/http/transport_test.go27
1 files changed, 27 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/net/http/transport_test.go b/src/net/http/transport_test.go
index e94ade5f7f..d7eef0d94c 100644
--- a/src/net/http/transport_test.go
+++ b/src/net/http/transport_test.go
@@ -5692,3 +5692,30 @@ func TestTransportIgnores408(t *testing.T) {
}
t.Fatalf("timeout after %v waiting for Transport connections to die off", time.Since(t0))
}
+
+func TestInvalidHeaderResponse(t *testing.T) {
+ setParallel(t)
+ defer afterTest(t)
+ cst := newClientServerTest(t, h1Mode, HandlerFunc(func(w ResponseWriter, r *Request) {
+ conn, buf, _ := w.(Hijacker).Hijack()
+ buf.Write([]byte("HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n" +
+ "Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2017 19:09:27 GMT\r\n" +
+ "Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\r\n" +
+ "Content-Length: 0\r\n" +
+ "Foo : bar\r\n\r\n"))
+ buf.Flush()
+ conn.Close()
+ }))
+ defer cst.close()
+ res, err := cst.c.Get(cst.ts.URL)
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ defer res.Body.Close()
+ if v := res.Header.Get("Foo"); v != "" {
+ t.Errorf(`unexpected "Foo" header: %q`, v)
+ }
+ if v := res.Header.Get("Foo "); v != "bar" {
+ t.Errorf(`bad "Foo " header value: %q, want %q`, v, "bar")
+ }
+}