From 2f148e66413c6260bbf21ad961260d76e623dcc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jordan Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2022 18:17:19 +0000 Subject: jordan.im: fellow creatures --- jordan.im/w/Makefile | 14 ++ jordan.im/w/fellow-creatures.7 | 420 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 434 insertions(+) create mode 100644 jordan.im/w/Makefile create mode 100644 jordan.im/w/fellow-creatures.7 diff --git a/jordan.im/w/Makefile b/jordan.im/w/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..03d0516 --- /dev/null +++ b/jordan.im/w/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +WEBROOT = /var/www/jordan.im + +FILES = index.html style.css + +all: ${FILES} + +index.html: index.7 + mandoc -T html -O style=../style.css index.7 > index.html + +install: ${FILES} + install -c -m 644 ${FILES} ${WEBROOT} + +clean: + rm -f index.html diff --git a/jordan.im/w/fellow-creatures.7 b/jordan.im/w/fellow-creatures.7 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a257468 --- /dev/null +++ b/jordan.im/w/fellow-creatures.7 @@ -0,0 +1,420 @@ +.Dd February 11, 2021 +.Dt FELLOW-CREATURES 7 +.Os jordan.im +. +.Sh NAME +.Nm Christine M Korsgaard - Fellow Creatures +.Nd Our Obligations to the Other Animals +. +.Sh SYNOPSIS +These notes are taken from lectures, essays, and book excerpts by Christine +Korsgaard as they relate to her book Fellow Creatures. +. +.Sh DESCRIPTION + +Korsgaard's views are based on the views of Immanuel Kant, who's held that we +must value every human being as what he called "an end in itself", by which he +meant that we should treat every human being as having inherent value, from +which it follows that their choices should be respected, that their ends should +be promoted, that their rights should be recognized and upheld by the +community, and that their happiness is valuable and their suffering is bad; +it's to say the things which matter to them should matter to all of us, and +that they should matter to us because they matter to them. + +Kant contrasted treating someone as an end in themselves with treating them as +mere means, which means using them for our own purposes in a way that's +contrary to their own good and to which they could not possibly consent. + +Many people accept something like a Kantian notion of the inherent value of +individuals as a basis for our moral obligations to other humans, but we human +beings have not been willing to afford this kind of value to the other animals +who share the world with us; instead, we use them in all kinds of ways. + +We eat them, we experiment on them, we test products on them, we keep ourselves +warm with their fur, skin, and feathers, we use them for transport, we've +enlisted them in our wars and police work, employed them to sniff out bombs and +drugs, we've made them fight and race for our amusement, have found joy and +comfort in their companionship, and subjected them to immense amounts of +torture and suffering in factory farms where they live short lives in dreadful +conditions where they never get to see the sky. + +These uses have been, by and large, at the expense of the interests of the +animals themselves. Even when we don't use other animals for our own ends, +human beings have often been completely heedless of their welfare, freely +killing them whenever they're a nuisance to us, and depriving them of the +habitat upon which they and their communities depend for leading their own +lives. + +We need to ask ourselves what, if anything, could possibly justify this +difference between the way we treat other human beings (or how we think we +ought to treat them) and the way we treat the other animals. After all, +animals, or at least many of them, are beings capable of suffering and joy, +with lives and interests of their own. They are the types of beings for whom +things can be good or bad. We, then, should ask ourselves what accounts for the +vast moral difference in what we believe constitutes permissible treatment of +humans compared to non-human animals. + +Kant believed only rational beings should be seen as ends in themselves, and +that we're therefore free to use the other animals as means to our ends. He +thought we have no moral duties to the other animals, and that they are not +objects of direct moral consideration. Most people are uncomfortable with that +conclusion, because most people believe that it's morally wrong to subject an +animal to unnecessary cruelty. Like Thomas Aquinas before him, Kant explained +this by arguing that it's wrong to be cruel to animals not because we owe kind +treatment directly to the animals themselves, but because if we're cruel to +animals we're more likely to be cruel to people too. He thought we have what +people have come to call an "indirect duty" to avoid cruelty to animals. + +Korsgaard disagrees with Kant in thinking we should not be kind to animals to +keep our kindness "in practice" for the sake of humans but because we owe it to +the animals themselves not to harm them if we can avoid it. Although many +people acknowledge that we have some duties to animals, most people seem to +believe these duties are rather weak as they apparently give way to almost any +human interest short of a malicious delight in cruelty itself. + +People who think the ways in which we treat animals today is morally +permissible never seem to write about it or say why they think so; the +philosophical literature on animal ethics is almost entirely devoted to +defending the idea that we have more extensive duties to animals than most +might usually suppose. The defender of animals has almost no +philosophically-articulated position to argue against. + +What non-philosophical people tend to believe is that humans are simply more +important than the other animals, and this difference explains the vast +difference in the ways we're willing to treat them. This is the starting point +in Fellow Creatures; she begins by asking whether human beings are really more +important than the other animals. The conclusion she reaches is that we're not, +not because the other animals are as important as we are, but rather because +claims about the relative importance of different kinds of creatures do not +make any sense at all. + +Things are important only when they are important to someone, human or +non-human. While it's true that I can be more important to my mother or my dog +compared to someone to whom they have no relation, we cannot therefore +establish some sort of cosmic hierarchy of importance among creatures. If +everything that's important is important because it's important to someone, +then there could only be such cosmic hierarchy if some kind of creature was +more important to all of the creatures than they are even to themselves. +Similarly, Korsgaard believes that for something to be good or bad it has to be +good or bad for someone. In the second chapter of Fellow Creatures Korsgaard +offers a theory of the good based on this idea. + +If it does not make sense to say that humans are simply more important than +other animals, is there some other difference between them that might explain +in the ways we think we're allowed to treat them. Many philosophers who write +in support of the moral claims of animals believe that in order to make their +case, it's necessary to establish that all differences between humans and other +animals are matters of degree; that there's no flat distinction between us, +sometimes appealing to evolution in arguing any difference must necessarily be +a matter of degree, and that claims of human uniqueness are therefore +unscientific. + +In contrast, Charles Darwin argued in The Descent of Man that humans are the +animals who base their decisions about what to do on thoughts about what we +ought to do; that humans are the only moral animals. He held that sociability, +intelligence, and memory are matters of degree, but when combined in a high +degree they produce something new, like the capacity for thoughts about what we +ought to do, and that a belief in human uniqueness is not unscientific so long +as you can explain it in terms of other attributes that we have to a higher +degree than other animals. + +Korsgaard agrees that humans are indeed different from the other animals, but +asks in the third chapter of Fellow Creatures what difference (if any) supports +the claim that human beings are entitled to treat animals in the ways that we +do. She argues that human beings are rational and moral animals, that the other +animals are not. By rational, she does not mean that we're merely intelligent +and think in an orderly way, but rather that we ask ourselves whether the +reasons for which we believe and do things are good or bad. Korsgaard believes +the other animals do not ask evaluative questions about their reasons for +action and belief. By moral, she does not mean that humans are morally good, +but that because of the way we choose our actions, our actions are subject to +moral standards, that they can be either morally good or bad, while the actions +of the other animals are not subject to moral standards, and cannot be morally +good or bad. + +It does not follow from these differences that human beings are better than the +other animals, because you can only judge one creature to be better than +another when they're subject to a common evaluative standard. In the absence of +such a common standard we cannot rate them against one other. What follows from +the fact that we're rational and moral and the other animals are not is not +that we're superior, but rather that we can have duties to them even though +they can have no duties to us. + +For similar reasons, Korsgaard argues against the view that what matters to +people matters more because our lives are more valuable in the sense of being +richer and more interesting than the lives of the other animals. Many people, +including some of the more important philosophical defenders of animals like +Peter Singer and Jeff McMahan think that life matters more to humans than it +does to the other animals because people can enjoy art, music, science, +philosophy, have deep, meaningful friendships and so on. Korsgaard rejects this +argument, and argues instead that what counts as a good life for an animal +depends on the nature of that animal; a dog's life is no worse for him because +he doesn't enjoy listening to music than yours is for you because you don't +enjoy chasing squirrels. + +There's a different way in which it might matter that we're the only moral +animals (if indeed we are), which brings us back to Kant and the second part of +Fellow Creatures which addresses Kant's views and what they imply about the +treatment of animals. As mentioned above, Kant believed only rational beings +should be treated as ends in themselves, and therefore believed the other +animals are not direct objects of moral concern. His view is not, as people +commonly suppose, that rationality is an especially valuable property, and we +are especially valuable because we have it, but rather that the capacity to +recognize and respond to reasons, including each other's reasons, places +rational beings in relations of reciprocity which enable us to make certain +claims on each other. + +Kant's argument was something like this: I'm a rational being when I judge that +something is good or bad for me or one of my loved ones; I treat is something +that is good absolutely, and by absolutely I mean that I have a good reason to +pursue or realize it as long as I neither harm nor wrong anyone else in doing +so. To be good absolutely is to be recognized as good in anyone's eyes. +Furthermore, I feel that I demand that others must respect my pursuit of it by +not interfering with my actions or attempting to manipulate my choices, and by +aiding me in my pursuit of the end if I'm in need of help. + +By the same token, when I recognize that another person has a good reason for +what he does, I recognize that I should not interfere with his choice, and +possibly should also help him if he's in need. In this way, when we choose to +pursue our ends, we make a set of demands on ourselves and on others, a set of +laws by which we mutually obligate one another to respect and assist us. The +reciprocal demands which rational beings make on each other constitute us as +a moral community, pursuing common ends under common moral laws; Kant famously +called this the "kingdom of ends". Kant thought that animals should not be +treated as ends in themselves because they cannot be part of this community +because, not being rational, they cannot create or respond to moral laws, and +therefore are not ends in themselves. + +Unlike the argument that human beings are privileged or superior simply because +rationality is such a valuable property, this is not an uninteresting argument. +Relations of reciprocity are essential to our moral duties to other human +beings. Nevertheless, Korsgaard argues that Kant's story was incomplete. As +Kant saw it, when I make a choice, I make a kind of law for myself that +I should realize a certain end, adopt it as a principle, and I make it a law +for others to not interfere with me in the pursuit of this end, and possibly +that they should even help me to achieve it. But prior to that decision is +another: the decision that something should be treated as a good end absolutely +by myself and others simply because it's good for me, or someone I care about. +This is a prior weighing which I claim the standing of the end itself, simply +because I'm a creature for whom things can be good or bad, I claim that what's +good for me should be treated as good absolutely, as something that someone +must respect and pursue. + +Human beings are certainly not the only creatures for whom things can be good +or bad, that's true of all the other animals or at least the sentient ones. If +the arguments for human superiority and importance fail, as Korsgaard thinks +they do, there is no reason why what is good for rational beings should be +treated as good absolutely, while what is good for the other animals can be +ignored or discounted. Animals are ends in themselves in this sense too. + +There are two senses of being an end in yourself. Being a legislator in the +moral community by making and responding to the laws we make for each other is +one way of being an end in yourself, shared only by rational beings, having +a good is another, shared by the other beings and rational beings alike. +Korsgaard argues that Kant was correct in thinking that other animals cannot +join us in making laws for one another in the kingdom of ends; our moral +relations to humans are different from our relations to the other animals. We +owe other rational beings certain duties of respect, having to do with choice +and freedom that we don't owe to the other animals, but we have the same reason +for treating what's good for the animal as good absolutely as we do for +treating our own good that way, which is because it's somebody's good; the good +of a creature for whom things can be good or bad. + +Rational beings are members of the moral community in the active sense. We +create it by making the laws for ourselves and each other. Animals are members +of the moral community in a passive sense, they fall under the protection of +its laws. + +It's worth discussing the similarities and differences between the Kantian +position sketched above and the utilitarian or consequentialist defense of the +moral claims of animals. Utilitarians usually believe that either pleasure and +the avoidance of pain or the satisfaction of desire and the avoidance its +frustration are good in themselves. Any creature who is capable of experiencing +those things has an interest in getting pleasure or his desires satisfied, and +all such creatures have moral standing, meaning that what happens to them +matters for its own sake. On Korsgaard's view, creatures for whom things can be +good or bad have moral standing, they're ends in themselves in the sense of +them having a good, which is the Kantian analog to moral standing. The two +positions identify the same creatures as having moral standing (sentient +animals). + +Where the two theories differ is in how they understand the idea that if you +have standing then what happens to you matters for its own sake. Utilitarians +understand that this way: pleasure or the satisfaction of desire is good in +itself, so it matters wherever it happens, human or non-human. Animals have +standing because good and bad things occur in their lives. The Kantian instead +places value in the first instance on the creature herself. People and other +animals matter, and what happens to them matters because it matters to them. In +the utilitarian theory, the value of humans and other animals in inherited from +the value of the things that can happen to them. In the Kantian theory the +importance of what happens to the creature derives from its importance to the +create himself. + +This difference between the Kantian and utilitarian view has practical +consequences. Because utilitarians think that pleasure is good in itself, they +think it makes sense to add and subtract pleasures across the boundaries +between creatures. If the sacrifice of one animal's good led to a greater total +good for a number of other animals it would, according to the utilitarian, be +justified, which is why utilitarians are often in favor of medical research on +animals. A few animals lead lives of torment, but as a result many other +animals (humans, predominantly) are saved. If my pleasures are good only +insofar as they're good for me, and yours are good only insofar as they're good +for you, we cannot simply add and subtract them in this way; there's no being +for whom your pleasures in addition to my pleasures are better. The sacrifice +of one creature's life or happiness for the sake of others is never that +straightforwardly justified. + +In the third part of Fellow Creatures, Korsgaard explores the consequences of +this position. She takes the wrongness of factory farming to be obvious, but +she argues that we should not eat animals at all. Some people believe in what +they call "humane farming", where the animals are allegedly treated well and +then slaughtered mercifully. Even in a so-called humane farm however the +animals must be killed as soon as they reach a sufficient size and development +to be eaten, living a life far shorter than they would've otherwise lived. +Likewise, dairy animals are killed when they can no longer be productive, which +is long before their natural term of life. The idea that humane farming is +morally acceptable depends on another quite controversial thesis: the idea that +death is not a bad thing for a non-human animal. + +It's said that whether animals are healthy and comfortable while they're alive +is what matters, but not how long they live, or whether at any moment they +continue to live. Korsgaard contests this argument. While there are some +reasons to believe that death is often a worse thing for a human being than for +another animal; human beings have plans and hopes for the future in a way that +so far as we can tell the other animals do not, and death disrupts these plans, +philosophers believe that the main thing that's bad about death is that it's +loss. It's the loss of whatever good you would've experienced had you continued +to live, an argument which holds for animals as much as it does for humans. If +death is bad for animals then we shouldn't eat them given that it's perfectly +possible to have an adequate diet without doing so. + +Korsgaard believes the entailment most people would contend with is the +implication that we should not perform experiments on animals for the sake of +medical progress; it's a much more serious matter than simply giving up a kind +of food we might like. That said, she believes that once we give up the idea +that we're free to use animals in ways that are contrary to their good, there +is no way around it. After all, the best way to make medical progress and +improve human lives would be to do experiments on people, but we don't do that +because we know that it's wrong, and no one thinks that's an unacceptable +sacrifice. + +There exists a certain kind of overheated rhetoric which claims that by +experimenting on animals we can "save" human lives. It's a good idea to +remember that there's an important sense in which we can't actually do that, +namely that everyone dies anyway. What we can do is extend human lives (which +of course is good), but we should ask ourselves whether it's worth imposing +immense suffering and death on animals in order to do so. + +Korsgaard also argues that we should not use animal products or make animals +work if the only way to do that is harmful or fatal to the animals themselves, +which in many cases it is. In the military, dolphins and seals are often used +in naval operations because of their ability to detect underwater objects with +sonar. In police work, dogs are used to sniff out drugs and locate humans. If +we have the right to ask people to take risks to fight crime, do we have the +right to ask the other animals to do so as well? Korsgaard argues it depends on +whether the animals, like humans, benefit from living in the state and are +adequately dependent on its laws, something which is certainly not the case in +the present. This case raises very different issues for wild and domesticated +animals since the law treats them very differently. Wild animals are for the +most part only protected as representatives of their species, not as +individuals, and do not live in any particular state. + +Another set of practical questions concern the extinction and preservation of +species. As many noticed, the concerns of environmental ethics and the concerns +of animal ethics often seem to be at odds, since the preservation of species or +the environment may require doing things which are harmful to individual +animals. The obvious example is when a group of animals is culled to prevent +them from populating beyond the carrying capacity in which they live. Korsgaard +does not propose a solution, but does devote space in the last part of the book +to ask what a species is, and why it's something we should care about at all. + +There's obvious reason to care about the biodiversity upon which we all depend, +but that's not a reason to care about each particular species. Some species +matter much more to the health and ecosystem than others do. It's puzzling how +so many people care deeply about the survival of endangered species who do not +seem particularly inclined to care about individual animals. In fact, concern +for species sometimes makes people treat individual animals as if they were +nothing more than abstract representatives of their species. Korsgaard believes +it's important to remember that each individual animal is a center of +subjectivity with a life of his or her own. She argues that it's important to +care about and value communities of animals for the sake of the animals +themselves by virtue of their individual dependence on their respective +communities, but it is not however a reason to a reason for keeping members of +endangered species in zoos, at least unless there's some hope of reestablishing +their communities, but possibly not even then. Keeping animals in zoos at their +own expense is often a case of treating them simply as an abstract +representative of its species and not as an individual with a life of their +own. + +The friends of animals tend to divide themselves into two opposing groups. +Animal welfarists and so-called animal rights theorists. Animal welfarists are +focused on the elimination of cruelty, while animal rights theorists focus in +the idea that it's wrong to use animals as a means to our ends. The word +"right" is sometimes used to refer to a kind of moral claim, a kind of claim +which philosophers associate with what's called a "perfect duty". A right in +this sense is a moral claim that's either absolute, or can only be overridden +by another right; it cannot be overridden simply because it does a lot of good +to override it. The word right is also used to refer to the kind of moral claim +that either is or should be coercively enforced by laws. + +Animal welfarists often advocate interventions in nature to protect wild +animals, for example using contraception to keep populations at reasonable +levels so we don't have to face the question of culling them. The most extreme +view advocated by Jeff McMahan and others is that if we could find a way to +eliminate predator species without harming individuals or upsetting the balance +of nature then we would be obligated to do so, since predation is so cruel. If +we phased out the predators perhaps with contraception, we would of course have +to find a different way to control the populations of prey animals; maybe that +would be through contraception too. + +Such extensive interventions in the case of wild animals would in a way turn +them into domestic animals, animals whose breeding and welfare is dependent on +human beings, which is what we understand "domestic" to mean. Many animal +rights theorists on the other hand oppose all human interaction with animals on +the grounds that we could only be using them for our own ends, and we could +certainly not get their consent. They think this is true even when keeping +pets, a practice which they believe should be phased out. We should of course +take care of the animals who have been bred to be pets already, but we should +stop breeding pets for this purpose now so that the practice of keeping pats +will eventually be eliminated, or so they believe, and think all animals should +be wild. + +Korsgaard notes that both sides advocate for what amounts to be a sweeping +change in the relation between human beings and nature itself. If the +welfarists have their way, all animals would be domestic animals, actively +cared for by human beings. If the rights theorists have their way, all animals +will be wild animals, whom we may only admire at a distance, taking no +responsibility for the cruel aspects of their lives, such as predation and +injury, and as far as possible not interacting with them at all. + +The animal rights position as understood in the philosophical literature mostly +uses rights in the first sense, to refer to an especially strict kind of moral +duty, although many animal rights theorists also champion legal rights for +animals. Korsgaard does not discuss legal rights for animals in Fellow +Creatures, but does discuss them in a paper entitled "The Claims of Animals and +the Needs of Strangers: Two Cases of Imperfect Right", wherein she works out +a Kantian case for animal rights in the natural rights tradition. + +In the last part of the book, Korsgaard talks about why it's so hard for people +to accept the idea that we have a sense of duty toward the other animals. It +isn't simply because the sacrifice of goods and services upon which we +traditionally claim seems demanding, but that she believes people find the idea +of our having duties to other animals unsettling, because given what human +beings are and the ways we live, and what other animals are and the way they +live, it's not possible for us to always treat them rightly. + +We can't control the violence in nature but given our moral standards we can't +simply ignore it either. Rather than face this fact, people pretend that we +have no moral duties to animals at all, or only very weak ones. Learning to +relate rightly with the other animals with whom we share the planet is not just +a matter of being willing to make this or that sacrifice of our interest when +they're at odds with the good of animals, it's a matter of coming to terms with +our relationship with a natural world that is at the same time both our home +and a place governed by standards which are alien to the standards of human +beings. + +Korsgaard thinks we should face this fact squarely, and do as much as we can to +treat those animals with whom we do interact in accordance with our moral +standards. Animals are beings who share a fate with us, they are conscious +creatures, and they are creatures for whom things can be good or bad. That +makes them our fellow creatures and we should treat them as such. -- cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf