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authorJordan <me@jordan.im>2022-03-27 20:02:23 +0000
committerJordan <me@jordan.im>2022-03-27 20:02:23 +0000
commit78deae288b5cf8e730188199f607f709466d35b6 (patch)
treeb9cce245ce3e15dc96ccd3905e8bef2794e08d36
parent2f148e66413c6260bbf21ad961260d76e623dcc1 (diff)
downloadwww-78deae288b5cf8e730188199f607f709466d35b6.tar.gz
www-78deae288b5cf8e730188199f607f709466d35b6.zip
jordan.im: whois service, misc updates
-rw-r--r--jordan.im/index.76
-rw-r--r--jordan.im/index.html100
-rw-r--r--jordan.im/w/fellow-creatures.7420
-rw-r--r--whois.jordan.im/Makefile (renamed from jordan.im/w/Makefile)4
-rw-r--r--whois.jordan.im/index.748
-rw-r--r--whois.jordan.im/index.html65
-rw-r--r--whois.jordan.im/style.css22
7 files changed, 243 insertions, 422 deletions
diff --git a/jordan.im/index.7 b/jordan.im/index.7
index 9398fd3..915e8d9 100644
--- a/jordan.im/index.7
+++ b/jordan.im/index.7
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ dependency-laden.
.
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Lk https://git.jordan.im/asn/ asn
+Map networks to their corresponding Autonomous System via WHOIS
.It Lk https://git.jordan.im/crane/ crane
Research literature archival and categorization web service
.It Lk https://git.jordan.im/keep/ keep
@@ -47,6 +49,10 @@ Miscellaneous unsorted tools and utilities
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Lk https://whois.jordan.im/ whois
+Public
+.Lk https://git.jordan.im/asn asn
+instance; map hostnames/addresses to autonomous systems
.It Lk https://iv.jordan.im/feed/trending invidious
YouTube front-end browsing proxy; no tracking or JavaScript
.It Lk https://r.jordan.im/ research archive
diff --git a/jordan.im/index.html b/jordan.im/index.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..61d9f7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/jordan.im/index.html
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html>
+<head>
+ <meta charset="utf-8"/>
+ <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0"/>
+ <link rel="stylesheet" href="style.css" type="text/css" media="all"/>
+ <title>JORDAN.IM(7)</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<table class="head">
+ <tr>
+ <td class="head-ltitle">JORDAN.IM(7)</td>
+ <td class="head-vol">Miscellaneous Information Manual</td>
+ <td class="head-rtitle">JORDAN.IM(7)</td>
+ </tr>
+</table>
+<div class="manual-text">
+<section class="Sh">
+<h1 class="Sh" id="NAME"><a class="permalink" href="#NAME">NAME</a></h1>
+<p class="Pp"><code class="Nm">jordan</code> &#x2014; <span class="Nd">software
+ engineer, tinkerer</span></p>
+</section>
+<section class="Sh">
+<h1 class="Sh" id="SYNOPSIS"><a class="permalink" href="#SYNOPSIS">SYNOPSIS</a></h1>
+<table class="Nm">
+ <tr>
+ <td><code class="Nm">mail</code></td>
+ <td><a class="Mt" href="mailto:me@jordan.im">me@jordan.im</a>
+ <a class="Lk" href="https://jordan.im/jordan.im-pub.asc">0x3702FBE9EA0CFAE0</a></td>
+ </tr>
+</table>
+<br/>
+<table class="Nm">
+ <tr>
+ <td><code class="Nm">dove</code></td>
+ <td>on libera.chat</td>
+ </tr>
+</table>
+</section>
+<section class="Sh">
+<h1 class="Sh" id="DESCRIPTION"><a class="permalink" href="#DESCRIPTION">DESCRIPTION</a></h1>
+<p class="Pp">I write software oriented around research literature, censorship,
+ and data archival, preferring the minimal and concise to the needlessly
+ complex and dependency-laden.</p>
+<dl class="Bl-tag">
+ <dt><a class="Lk" href="https://git.jordan.im/asn/">asn</a></dt>
+ <dd>Map networks to their corresponding Autonomous System via WHOIS</dd>
+ <dt><a class="Lk" href="https://git.jordan.im/crane/">crane</a></dt>
+ <dd>Research literature archival and categorization web service</dd>
+ <dt><a class="Lk" href="https://git.jordan.im/keep/">keep</a></dt>
+ <dd>Discord self-bot which caches and archives URLs at the Internet
+ Archive</dd>
+ <dt><a class="Lk" href="https://git.jordan.im/roka/">roka</a></dt>
+ <dd>Listen to audiobooks with podcast apps via RSS</dd>
+ <dt><a class="Lk" href="https://git.jordan.im/crawl/">crawl</a></dt>
+ <dd>A simple recursive web crawler which stores content in WARC/1.0</dd>
+ <dt><a class="Lk" href="https://git.jordan.im/allium/">allium</a></dt>
+ <dd>Tor relay metrics and statistics rendered from a single API request</dd>
+ <dt><a class="Lk" href="https://git.jordan.im/ft-bypass/">ft-bypass</a></dt>
+ <dd>Transparent caching proxy and paywall bypass for The Financial Times</dd>
+ <dt><a class="Lk" href="https://git.jordan.im/tent/">tent</a></dt>
+ <dd>Python's http.server module written in Golang</dd>
+ <dt><a class="Lk" href="https://git.jordan.im/pouch/">pouch</a></dt>
+ <dd>Save pocketed (read) articles to PDF from exported account data</dd>
+ <dt><a class="Lk" href="https://git.jordan.im/www/">www</a></dt>
+ <dd>Makefiles and assets for mandoc-generated sites</dd>
+ <dt><a class="Lk" href="https://git.jordan.im/dotfiles/">dotfiles</a></dt>
+ <dd>Personal configuration files for applications on unix-based systems</dd>
+ <dt><a class="Lk" href="https://git.jordan.im/bin/">bin</a></dt>
+ <dd>Miscellaneous unsorted tools and utilities</dd>
+</dl>
+</section>
+<section class="Sh">
+<h1 class="Sh" id="SEE_ALSO"><a class="permalink" href="#SEE_ALSO">SEE
+ ALSO</a></h1>
+<dl class="Bl-tag">
+ <dt><a class="Lk" href="https://whois.jordan.im/">whois</a></dt>
+ <dd>Public <a class="Lk" href="https://git.jordan.im/asn">asn</a> instance;
+ map hostnames/addresses to autonomous systems</dd>
+ <dt><a class="Lk" href="https://iv.jordan.im/feed/trending">invidious</a></dt>
+ <dd>YouTube front-end browsing proxy; no tracking or JavaScript</dd>
+ <dt><a class="Lk" href="https://r.jordan.im/">research archive</a></dt>
+ <dd>Literature discussing ethics, nutrition, ecology, and technology</dd>
+ <dt><a class="Lk" href="https://jordan.im/ipfs/bafybeiaysi4s6lnjev27ln5icwm6tueaw2vdykrtjkwiphwekaywqhcjze/wiki/">ipfs
+ gateway</a></dt>
+ <dd>Access resources hosted on the IPFS network</dd>
+ <dt><a class="Lk" href="https://tracker.jordan.im/">bittorrent
+ tracker</a></dt>
+ <dd>Public opentracker instance accepting connections over UDP</dd>
+</dl>
+</section>
+</div>
+<table class="foot">
+ <tr>
+ <td class="foot-date">December 30, 2021</td>
+ <td class="foot-os">OpenBSD / Alpine Linux</td>
+ </tr>
+</table>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/jordan.im/w/fellow-creatures.7 b/jordan.im/w/fellow-creatures.7
deleted file mode 100644
index a257468..0000000
--- a/jordan.im/w/fellow-creatures.7
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,420 +0,0 @@
-.Dd February 11, 2021
-.Dt FELLOW-CREATURES 7
-.Os jordan.im
-.
-.Sh NAME
-.Nm Christine M Korsgaard - Fellow Creatures
-.Nd Our Obligations to the Other Animals
-.
-.Sh SYNOPSIS
-These notes are taken from lectures, essays, and book excerpts by Christine
-Korsgaard as they relate to her book Fellow Creatures.
-.
-.Sh DESCRIPTION
-
-Korsgaard's views are based on the views of Immanuel Kant, who's held that we
-must value every human being as what he called "an end in itself", by which he
-meant that we should treat every human being as having inherent value, from
-which it follows that their choices should be respected, that their ends should
-be promoted, that their rights should be recognized and upheld by the
-community, and that their happiness is valuable and their suffering is bad;
-it's to say the things which matter to them should matter to all of us, and
-that they should matter to us because they matter to them.
-
-Kant contrasted treating someone as an end in themselves with treating them as
-mere means, which means using them for our own purposes in a way that's
-contrary to their own good and to which they could not possibly consent.
-
-Many people accept something like a Kantian notion of the inherent value of
-individuals as a basis for our moral obligations to other humans, but we human
-beings have not been willing to afford this kind of value to the other animals
-who share the world with us; instead, we use them in all kinds of ways.
-
-We eat them, we experiment on them, we test products on them, we keep ourselves
-warm with their fur, skin, and feathers, we use them for transport, we've
-enlisted them in our wars and police work, employed them to sniff out bombs and
-drugs, we've made them fight and race for our amusement, have found joy and
-comfort in their companionship, and subjected them to immense amounts of
-torture and suffering in factory farms where they live short lives in dreadful
-conditions where they never get to see the sky.
-
-These uses have been, by and large, at the expense of the interests of the
-animals themselves. Even when we don't use other animals for our own ends,
-human beings have often been completely heedless of their welfare, freely
-killing them whenever they're a nuisance to us, and depriving them of the
-habitat upon which they and their communities depend for leading their own
-lives.
-
-We need to ask ourselves what, if anything, could possibly justify this
-difference between the way we treat other human beings (or how we think we
-ought to treat them) and the way we treat the other animals. After all,
-animals, or at least many of them, are beings capable of suffering and joy,
-with lives and interests of their own. They are the types of beings for whom
-things can be good or bad. We, then, should ask ourselves what accounts for the
-vast moral difference in what we believe constitutes permissible treatment of
-humans compared to non-human animals.
-
-Kant believed only rational beings should be seen as ends in themselves, and
-that we're therefore free to use the other animals as means to our ends. He
-thought we have no moral duties to the other animals, and that they are not
-objects of direct moral consideration. Most people are uncomfortable with that
-conclusion, because most people believe that it's morally wrong to subject an
-animal to unnecessary cruelty. Like Thomas Aquinas before him, Kant explained
-this by arguing that it's wrong to be cruel to animals not because we owe kind
-treatment directly to the animals themselves, but because if we're cruel to
-animals we're more likely to be cruel to people too. He thought we have what
-people have come to call an "indirect duty" to avoid cruelty to animals.
-
-Korsgaard disagrees with Kant in thinking we should not be kind to animals to
-keep our kindness "in practice" for the sake of humans but because we owe it to
-the animals themselves not to harm them if we can avoid it. Although many
-people acknowledge that we have some duties to animals, most people seem to
-believe these duties are rather weak as they apparently give way to almost any
-human interest short of a malicious delight in cruelty itself.
-
-People who think the ways in which we treat animals today is morally
-permissible never seem to write about it or say why they think so; the
-philosophical literature on animal ethics is almost entirely devoted to
-defending the idea that we have more extensive duties to animals than most
-might usually suppose. The defender of animals has almost no
-philosophically-articulated position to argue against.
-
-What non-philosophical people tend to believe is that humans are simply more
-important than the other animals, and this difference explains the vast
-difference in the ways we're willing to treat them. This is the starting point
-in Fellow Creatures; she begins by asking whether human beings are really more
-important than the other animals. The conclusion she reaches is that we're not,
-not because the other animals are as important as we are, but rather because
-claims about the relative importance of different kinds of creatures do not
-make any sense at all.
-
-Things are important only when they are important to someone, human or
-non-human. While it's true that I can be more important to my mother or my dog
-compared to someone to whom they have no relation, we cannot therefore
-establish some sort of cosmic hierarchy of importance among creatures. If
-everything that's important is important because it's important to someone,
-then there could only be such cosmic hierarchy if some kind of creature was
-more important to all of the creatures than they are even to themselves.
-Similarly, Korsgaard believes that for something to be good or bad it has to be
-good or bad for someone. In the second chapter of Fellow Creatures Korsgaard
-offers a theory of the good based on this idea.
-
-If it does not make sense to say that humans are simply more important than
-other animals, is there some other difference between them that might explain
-in the ways we think we're allowed to treat them. Many philosophers who write
-in support of the moral claims of animals believe that in order to make their
-case, it's necessary to establish that all differences between humans and other
-animals are matters of degree; that there's no flat distinction between us,
-sometimes appealing to evolution in arguing any difference must necessarily be
-a matter of degree, and that claims of human uniqueness are therefore
-unscientific.
-
-In contrast, Charles Darwin argued in The Descent of Man that humans are the
-animals who base their decisions about what to do on thoughts about what we
-ought to do; that humans are the only moral animals. He held that sociability,
-intelligence, and memory are matters of degree, but when combined in a high
-degree they produce something new, like the capacity for thoughts about what we
-ought to do, and that a belief in human uniqueness is not unscientific so long
-as you can explain it in terms of other attributes that we have to a higher
-degree than other animals.
-
-Korsgaard agrees that humans are indeed different from the other animals, but
-asks in the third chapter of Fellow Creatures what difference (if any) supports
-the claim that human beings are entitled to treat animals in the ways that we
-do. She argues that human beings are rational and moral animals, that the other
-animals are not. By rational, she does not mean that we're merely intelligent
-and think in an orderly way, but rather that we ask ourselves whether the
-reasons for which we believe and do things are good or bad. Korsgaard believes
-the other animals do not ask evaluative questions about their reasons for
-action and belief. By moral, she does not mean that humans are morally good,
-but that because of the way we choose our actions, our actions are subject to
-moral standards, that they can be either morally good or bad, while the actions
-of the other animals are not subject to moral standards, and cannot be morally
-good or bad.
-
-It does not follow from these differences that human beings are better than the
-other animals, because you can only judge one creature to be better than
-another when they're subject to a common evaluative standard. In the absence of
-such a common standard we cannot rate them against one other. What follows from
-the fact that we're rational and moral and the other animals are not is not
-that we're superior, but rather that we can have duties to them even though
-they can have no duties to us.
-
-For similar reasons, Korsgaard argues against the view that what matters to
-people matters more because our lives are more valuable in the sense of being
-richer and more interesting than the lives of the other animals. Many people,
-including some of the more important philosophical defenders of animals like
-Peter Singer and Jeff McMahan think that life matters more to humans than it
-does to the other animals because people can enjoy art, music, science,
-philosophy, have deep, meaningful friendships and so on. Korsgaard rejects this
-argument, and argues instead that what counts as a good life for an animal
-depends on the nature of that animal; a dog's life is no worse for him because
-he doesn't enjoy listening to music than yours is for you because you don't
-enjoy chasing squirrels.
-
-There's a different way in which it might matter that we're the only moral
-animals (if indeed we are), which brings us back to Kant and the second part of
-Fellow Creatures which addresses Kant's views and what they imply about the
-treatment of animals. As mentioned above, Kant believed only rational beings
-should be treated as ends in themselves, and therefore believed the other
-animals are not direct objects of moral concern. His view is not, as people
-commonly suppose, that rationality is an especially valuable property, and we
-are especially valuable because we have it, but rather that the capacity to
-recognize and respond to reasons, including each other's reasons, places
-rational beings in relations of reciprocity which enable us to make certain
-claims on each other.
-
-Kant's argument was something like this: I'm a rational being when I judge that
-something is good or bad for me or one of my loved ones; I treat is something
-that is good absolutely, and by absolutely I mean that I have a good reason to
-pursue or realize it as long as I neither harm nor wrong anyone else in doing
-so. To be good absolutely is to be recognized as good in anyone's eyes.
-Furthermore, I feel that I demand that others must respect my pursuit of it by
-not interfering with my actions or attempting to manipulate my choices, and by
-aiding me in my pursuit of the end if I'm in need of help.
-
-By the same token, when I recognize that another person has a good reason for
-what he does, I recognize that I should not interfere with his choice, and
-possibly should also help him if he's in need. In this way, when we choose to
-pursue our ends, we make a set of demands on ourselves and on others, a set of
-laws by which we mutually obligate one another to respect and assist us. The
-reciprocal demands which rational beings make on each other constitute us as
-a moral community, pursuing common ends under common moral laws; Kant famously
-called this the "kingdom of ends". Kant thought that animals should not be
-treated as ends in themselves because they cannot be part of this community
-because, not being rational, they cannot create or respond to moral laws, and
-therefore are not ends in themselves.
-
-Unlike the argument that human beings are privileged or superior simply because
-rationality is such a valuable property, this is not an uninteresting argument.
-Relations of reciprocity are essential to our moral duties to other human
-beings. Nevertheless, Korsgaard argues that Kant's story was incomplete. As
-Kant saw it, when I make a choice, I make a kind of law for myself that
-I should realize a certain end, adopt it as a principle, and I make it a law
-for others to not interfere with me in the pursuit of this end, and possibly
-that they should even help me to achieve it. But prior to that decision is
-another: the decision that something should be treated as a good end absolutely
-by myself and others simply because it's good for me, or someone I care about.
-This is a prior weighing which I claim the standing of the end itself, simply
-because I'm a creature for whom things can be good or bad, I claim that what's
-good for me should be treated as good absolutely, as something that someone
-must respect and pursue.
-
-Human beings are certainly not the only creatures for whom things can be good
-or bad, that's true of all the other animals or at least the sentient ones. If
-the arguments for human superiority and importance fail, as Korsgaard thinks
-they do, there is no reason why what is good for rational beings should be
-treated as good absolutely, while what is good for the other animals can be
-ignored or discounted. Animals are ends in themselves in this sense too.
-
-There are two senses of being an end in yourself. Being a legislator in the
-moral community by making and responding to the laws we make for each other is
-one way of being an end in yourself, shared only by rational beings, having
-a good is another, shared by the other beings and rational beings alike.
-Korsgaard argues that Kant was correct in thinking that other animals cannot
-join us in making laws for one another in the kingdom of ends; our moral
-relations to humans are different from our relations to the other animals. We
-owe other rational beings certain duties of respect, having to do with choice
-and freedom that we don't owe to the other animals, but we have the same reason
-for treating what's good for the animal as good absolutely as we do for
-treating our own good that way, which is because it's somebody's good; the good
-of a creature for whom things can be good or bad.
-
-Rational beings are members of the moral community in the active sense. We
-create it by making the laws for ourselves and each other. Animals are members
-of the moral community in a passive sense, they fall under the protection of
-its laws.
-
-It's worth discussing the similarities and differences between the Kantian
-position sketched above and the utilitarian or consequentialist defense of the
-moral claims of animals. Utilitarians usually believe that either pleasure and
-the avoidance of pain or the satisfaction of desire and the avoidance its
-frustration are good in themselves. Any creature who is capable of experiencing
-those things has an interest in getting pleasure or his desires satisfied, and
-all such creatures have moral standing, meaning that what happens to them
-matters for its own sake. On Korsgaard's view, creatures for whom things can be
-good or bad have moral standing, they're ends in themselves in the sense of
-them having a good, which is the Kantian analog to moral standing. The two
-positions identify the same creatures as having moral standing (sentient
-animals).
-
-Where the two theories differ is in how they understand the idea that if you
-have standing then what happens to you matters for its own sake. Utilitarians
-understand that this way: pleasure or the satisfaction of desire is good in
-itself, so it matters wherever it happens, human or non-human. Animals have
-standing because good and bad things occur in their lives. The Kantian instead
-places value in the first instance on the creature herself. People and other
-animals matter, and what happens to them matters because it matters to them. In
-the utilitarian theory, the value of humans and other animals in inherited from
-the value of the things that can happen to them. In the Kantian theory the
-importance of what happens to the creature derives from its importance to the
-create himself.
-
-This difference between the Kantian and utilitarian view has practical
-consequences. Because utilitarians think that pleasure is good in itself, they
-think it makes sense to add and subtract pleasures across the boundaries
-between creatures. If the sacrifice of one animal's good led to a greater total
-good for a number of other animals it would, according to the utilitarian, be
-justified, which is why utilitarians are often in favor of medical research on
-animals. A few animals lead lives of torment, but as a result many other
-animals (humans, predominantly) are saved. If my pleasures are good only
-insofar as they're good for me, and yours are good only insofar as they're good
-for you, we cannot simply add and subtract them in this way; there's no being
-for whom your pleasures in addition to my pleasures are better. The sacrifice
-of one creature's life or happiness for the sake of others is never that
-straightforwardly justified.
-
-In the third part of Fellow Creatures, Korsgaard explores the consequences of
-this position. She takes the wrongness of factory farming to be obvious, but
-she argues that we should not eat animals at all. Some people believe in what
-they call "humane farming", where the animals are allegedly treated well and
-then slaughtered mercifully. Even in a so-called humane farm however the
-animals must be killed as soon as they reach a sufficient size and development
-to be eaten, living a life far shorter than they would've otherwise lived.
-Likewise, dairy animals are killed when they can no longer be productive, which
-is long before their natural term of life. The idea that humane farming is
-morally acceptable depends on another quite controversial thesis: the idea that
-death is not a bad thing for a non-human animal.
-
-It's said that whether animals are healthy and comfortable while they're alive
-is what matters, but not how long they live, or whether at any moment they
-continue to live. Korsgaard contests this argument. While there are some
-reasons to believe that death is often a worse thing for a human being than for
-another animal; human beings have plans and hopes for the future in a way that
-so far as we can tell the other animals do not, and death disrupts these plans,
-philosophers believe that the main thing that's bad about death is that it's
-loss. It's the loss of whatever good you would've experienced had you continued
-to live, an argument which holds for animals as much as it does for humans. If
-death is bad for animals then we shouldn't eat them given that it's perfectly
-possible to have an adequate diet without doing so.
-
-Korsgaard believes the entailment most people would contend with is the
-implication that we should not perform experiments on animals for the sake of
-medical progress; it's a much more serious matter than simply giving up a kind
-of food we might like. That said, she believes that once we give up the idea
-that we're free to use animals in ways that are contrary to their good, there
-is no way around it. After all, the best way to make medical progress and
-improve human lives would be to do experiments on people, but we don't do that
-because we know that it's wrong, and no one thinks that's an unacceptable
-sacrifice.
-
-There exists a certain kind of overheated rhetoric which claims that by
-experimenting on animals we can "save" human lives. It's a good idea to
-remember that there's an important sense in which we can't actually do that,
-namely that everyone dies anyway. What we can do is extend human lives (which
-of course is good), but we should ask ourselves whether it's worth imposing
-immense suffering and death on animals in order to do so.
-
-Korsgaard also argues that we should not use animal products or make animals
-work if the only way to do that is harmful or fatal to the animals themselves,
-which in many cases it is. In the military, dolphins and seals are often used
-in naval operations because of their ability to detect underwater objects with
-sonar. In police work, dogs are used to sniff out drugs and locate humans. If
-we have the right to ask people to take risks to fight crime, do we have the
-right to ask the other animals to do so as well? Korsgaard argues it depends on
-whether the animals, like humans, benefit from living in the state and are
-adequately dependent on its laws, something which is certainly not the case in
-the present. This case raises very different issues for wild and domesticated
-animals since the law treats them very differently. Wild animals are for the
-most part only protected as representatives of their species, not as
-individuals, and do not live in any particular state.
-
-Another set of practical questions concern the extinction and preservation of
-species. As many noticed, the concerns of environmental ethics and the concerns
-of animal ethics often seem to be at odds, since the preservation of species or
-the environment may require doing things which are harmful to individual
-animals. The obvious example is when a group of animals is culled to prevent
-them from populating beyond the carrying capacity in which they live. Korsgaard
-does not propose a solution, but does devote space in the last part of the book
-to ask what a species is, and why it's something we should care about at all.
-
-There's obvious reason to care about the biodiversity upon which we all depend,
-but that's not a reason to care about each particular species. Some species
-matter much more to the health and ecosystem than others do. It's puzzling how
-so many people care deeply about the survival of endangered species who do not
-seem particularly inclined to care about individual animals. In fact, concern
-for species sometimes makes people treat individual animals as if they were
-nothing more than abstract representatives of their species. Korsgaard believes
-it's important to remember that each individual animal is a center of
-subjectivity with a life of his or her own. She argues that it's important to
-care about and value communities of animals for the sake of the animals
-themselves by virtue of their individual dependence on their respective
-communities, but it is not however a reason to a reason for keeping members of
-endangered species in zoos, at least unless there's some hope of reestablishing
-their communities, but possibly not even then. Keeping animals in zoos at their
-own expense is often a case of treating them simply as an abstract
-representative of its species and not as an individual with a life of their
-own.
-
-The friends of animals tend to divide themselves into two opposing groups.
-Animal welfarists and so-called animal rights theorists. Animal welfarists are
-focused on the elimination of cruelty, while animal rights theorists focus in
-the idea that it's wrong to use animals as a means to our ends. The word
-"right" is sometimes used to refer to a kind of moral claim, a kind of claim
-which philosophers associate with what's called a "perfect duty". A right in
-this sense is a moral claim that's either absolute, or can only be overridden
-by another right; it cannot be overridden simply because it does a lot of good
-to override it. The word right is also used to refer to the kind of moral claim
-that either is or should be coercively enforced by laws.
-
-Animal welfarists often advocate interventions in nature to protect wild
-animals, for example using contraception to keep populations at reasonable
-levels so we don't have to face the question of culling them. The most extreme
-view advocated by Jeff McMahan and others is that if we could find a way to
-eliminate predator species without harming individuals or upsetting the balance
-of nature then we would be obligated to do so, since predation is so cruel. If
-we phased out the predators perhaps with contraception, we would of course have
-to find a different way to control the populations of prey animals; maybe that
-would be through contraception too.
-
-Such extensive interventions in the case of wild animals would in a way turn
-them into domestic animals, animals whose breeding and welfare is dependent on
-human beings, which is what we understand "domestic" to mean. Many animal
-rights theorists on the other hand oppose all human interaction with animals on
-the grounds that we could only be using them for our own ends, and we could
-certainly not get their consent. They think this is true even when keeping
-pets, a practice which they believe should be phased out. We should of course
-take care of the animals who have been bred to be pets already, but we should
-stop breeding pets for this purpose now so that the practice of keeping pats
-will eventually be eliminated, or so they believe, and think all animals should
-be wild.
-
-Korsgaard notes that both sides advocate for what amounts to be a sweeping
-change in the relation between human beings and nature itself. If the
-welfarists have their way, all animals would be domestic animals, actively
-cared for by human beings. If the rights theorists have their way, all animals
-will be wild animals, whom we may only admire at a distance, taking no
-responsibility for the cruel aspects of their lives, such as predation and
-injury, and as far as possible not interacting with them at all.
-
-The animal rights position as understood in the philosophical literature mostly
-uses rights in the first sense, to refer to an especially strict kind of moral
-duty, although many animal rights theorists also champion legal rights for
-animals. Korsgaard does not discuss legal rights for animals in Fellow
-Creatures, but does discuss them in a paper entitled "The Claims of Animals and
-the Needs of Strangers: Two Cases of Imperfect Right", wherein she works out
-a Kantian case for animal rights in the natural rights tradition.
-
-In the last part of the book, Korsgaard talks about why it's so hard for people
-to accept the idea that we have a sense of duty toward the other animals. It
-isn't simply because the sacrifice of goods and services upon which we
-traditionally claim seems demanding, but that she believes people find the idea
-of our having duties to other animals unsettling, because given what human
-beings are and the ways we live, and what other animals are and the way they
-live, it's not possible for us to always treat them rightly.
-
-We can't control the violence in nature but given our moral standards we can't
-simply ignore it either. Rather than face this fact, people pretend that we
-have no moral duties to animals at all, or only very weak ones. Learning to
-relate rightly with the other animals with whom we share the planet is not just
-a matter of being willing to make this or that sacrifice of our interest when
-they're at odds with the good of animals, it's a matter of coming to terms with
-our relationship with a natural world that is at the same time both our home
-and a place governed by standards which are alien to the standards of human
-beings.
-
-Korsgaard thinks we should face this fact squarely, and do as much as we can to
-treat those animals with whom we do interact in accordance with our moral
-standards. Animals are beings who share a fate with us, they are conscious
-creatures, and they are creatures for whom things can be good or bad. That
-makes them our fellow creatures and we should treat them as such.
diff --git a/jordan.im/w/Makefile b/whois.jordan.im/Makefile
index 03d0516..75ce63e 100644
--- a/jordan.im/w/Makefile
+++ b/whois.jordan.im/Makefile
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-WEBROOT = /var/www/jordan.im
+WEBROOT = /var/www/whois.jordan.im
FILES = index.html style.css
all: ${FILES}
index.html: index.7
- mandoc -T html -O style=../style.css index.7 > index.html
+ mandoc -T html -O style=style.css index.7 > index.html
install: ${FILES}
install -c -m 644 ${FILES} ${WEBROOT}
diff --git a/whois.jordan.im/index.7 b/whois.jordan.im/index.7
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fc91ae2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/whois.jordan.im/index.7
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+.Dd March 24, 2022
+.Dt WHOIS.JORDAN.IM 7
+.Os "Alpine Linux"
+.
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm asn
+.Nd map hosts to their corresponding ASN over the WHOIS protocol
+
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Lk https://git.jordan.im/asn "asn(1)"
+is a WHOIS server which provides BGP announcement information sourced from
+a local database cache generated using the
+.Lk https://location.ipfire.org/ "IPFIRE"
+dataset.
+.Pp
+.Sy whois.jordan.im
+is a public
+.Nm
+instance for personal use.
+.
+.Sh USAGE
+.
+.Pp
+.Lk https://man.openbsd.org/whois.1 "whois(1)"
+can be used to communicate with the server using
+.Ar --host
+and
+.Ar --port
+arguments. Both hostnames and IP address are accepted.
+.
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+$ whois -h whois.jordan.im google.com
+
+AS Number | Country | AS Name | Announcement
+----------+---------+---------+--------------------
+15169 | US | GOOGLE | 142.250.0.0/15
+15169 | IE | GOOGLE | 2a00:1450:4009::/48
+
+$ whois -h whois.jordan.im 1.1.1.1
+
+AS Number | Country | AS Name | Announcement
+----------+---------+---------------+-------------
+13335 | AU | CLOUDFLARENET | 1.1.1.0/24
+.Ed
+.
+.Pp
+If a hostname is provided, queries for each resolved A/AAAA record will be
+returned. The dataset is regenerated daily to ensure response accuracy.
diff --git a/whois.jordan.im/index.html b/whois.jordan.im/index.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..402d9dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/whois.jordan.im/index.html
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html>
+<head>
+ <meta charset="utf-8"/>
+ <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0"/>
+ <link rel="stylesheet" href="style.css" type="text/css" media="all"/>
+ <title>WHOIS.JORDAN.IM(7)</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<table class="head">
+ <tr>
+ <td class="head-ltitle">WHOIS.JORDAN.IM(7)</td>
+ <td class="head-vol">Miscellaneous Information Manual</td>
+ <td class="head-rtitle">WHOIS.JORDAN.IM(7)</td>
+ </tr>
+</table>
+<div class="manual-text">
+<section class="Sh">
+<h1 class="Sh" id="NAME"><a class="permalink" href="#NAME">NAME</a></h1>
+<p class="Pp"><code class="Nm">asn</code> &#x2014; <span class="Nd">map hosts to
+ their corresponding ASN over the WHOIS protocol</span></p>
+<p class="Pp"></p>
+</section>
+<section class="Sh">
+<h1 class="Sh" id="DESCRIPTION"><a class="permalink" href="#DESCRIPTION">DESCRIPTION</a></h1>
+<p class="Pp"><a class="Lk" href="https://git.jordan.im/asn">asn(1)</a> is a
+ WHOIS server which provides BGP announcement information sourced from a
+ local database cache generated using the
+ <a class="Lk" href="https://location.ipfire.org/">IPFIRE</a> dataset.</p>
+<p class="Pp" id="whois.jordan.im"><a class="permalink" href="#whois.jordan.im"><b class="Sy">whois.jordan.im</b></a>
+ is a public <code class="Nm">asn</code> instance for personal use.</p>
+</section>
+<section class="Sh">
+<h1 class="Sh" id="USAGE"><a class="permalink" href="#USAGE">USAGE</a></h1>
+<p class="Pp"><a class="Lk" href="https://man.openbsd.org/whois.1">whois(1)</a>
+ can be used to communicate with the server using
+ <var class="Ar">--host</var> and <var class="Ar">--port</var> arguments.
+ Both hostnames and IP address are accepted.</p>
+<div class="Bd Pp Bd-indent Li">
+<pre>$ whois -h whois.jordan.im google.com
+
+AS Number | Country | AS Name | Announcement
+----------+---------+---------+--------------------
+15169 | US | GOOGLE | 142.250.0.0/15
+15169 | IE | GOOGLE | 2a00:1450:4009::/48
+
+$ whois -h whois.jordan.im 1.1.1.1
+
+AS Number | Country | AS Name | Announcement
+----------+---------+---------------+-------------
+13335 | AU | CLOUDFLARENET | 1.1.1.0/24</pre>
+</div>
+<p class="Pp">If a hostname is provided, queries for each resolved A/AAAA record
+ will be returned. The dataset is regenerated daily to ensure response
+ accuracy.</p>
+</section>
+</div>
+<table class="foot">
+ <tr>
+ <td class="foot-date">March 24, 2022</td>
+ <td class="foot-os">Alpine Linux</td>
+ </tr>
+</table>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/whois.jordan.im/style.css b/whois.jordan.im/style.css
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..740b52f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/whois.jordan.im/style.css
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+table.head, table.foot { width: 100%; }
+td.head-rtitle, td.foot-os { text-align: right; }
+td.head-vol { text-align: center; }
+div.Pp { margin: 1ex 0ex; }
+div.Nd, div.Bf, div.Op { display: inline; }
+span.Pa, span.Ad { font-style: italic; }
+span.Ms { font-weight: bold; }
+dl.Bl-diag > dt { font-weight: bold; }
+code.Nm, code.Fl, code.Cm, code.Ic, code.In, code.Fd, code.Fn,
+code.Cd { font-weight: bold; font-family: inherit; }
+
+html { font-family: monospace; line-height: 1.25em; }
+body { max-width: 80ch; margin: 1em auto; padding: 0 1ch; }
+table { border-collapse: collapse; }
+table.Nm code.Nm { padding-right: 1ch; }
+table.foot { margin-top: 1em; }
+
+html { background-color: var(--ansi16); color: var(--ansi17); }
+a { color: var(--ansi4); }
+a:visited { color: var(--ansi5); }
+a.permalink { color: var(--ansi3); text-decoration: none; }
+