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Filename: 189-authorize-cell.txt
Title: AUTHORIZE and AUTHORIZED cells
Author: George Kadianakis
Created: 04 Nov 2011
Status: Obsolete

1. Overview

   Proposal 187 introduced the concept of the AUTHORIZE cell, a cell
   whose purpose is to make Tor bridges resistant to scanning attacks.

   This is achieved by having the bridge and the client share a secret
   out-of-band and then use AUTHORIZE cells to validate that the
   client indeed knows that secret before proceeding with the Tor
   protocol.

   This proposal specifies the format of the AUTHORIZE cell and also
   introduces the AUTHORIZED cell, a way for bridges to announce to
   clients that the authorization process is complete and successful.

2. Motivation

   AUTHORIZE cells should be able to perform a variety of
   authorization protocols based on a variety of shared secrets. This
   forces the AUTHORIZE cell to have a dynamic format based on the
   authorization method used.

   AUTHORIZED cells are used by bridges to signal the end of a
   successful bridge client authorization and the beginning of the
   actual link handshake. AUTHORIZED cells have no other use and for
   this reason their format is very simple.

   Both AUTHORIZE and AUTHORIZED cells are to be used under censorship
   conditions and they should look innocuous to any adversary capable
   of monitoring network traffic.

   As an attack example, an adversary could passively monitor the
   traffic of a bridge host, looking at the packets directly after the
   TLS handshake and trying to deduce from their packet size if they
   are AUTHORIZE and AUTHORIZED cells. For this reason, AUTHORIZE and
   AUTHORIZED cells are padded with a random amount of padding before
   sending.

3. Design

3.1. AUTHORIZE cell

   The AUTHORIZE cell is a variable-sized cell.

   The generic AUTHORIZE cell format is:

         AuthMethod                       [1 octet]
         MethodFields                     [...]
         PadLen                           [2 octets]
         Padding                          ['PadLen' octets]

   where:

   'AuthMethod', is the authorization method to be used.

   'MethodFields', is dependent on the authorization Method used. It's
                   a meta-field hosting an arbitrary amount of fields.

   'PadLen', specifies the amount of padding in octets.
   Implementations SHOULD pick 'PadLen' to be a random integer from 1
   to 3141 inclusive.

   'Padding', is 'PadLen' octets of random content.

3.2. AUTHORIZED cell format

   The AUTHORIZED cell is a variable-sized cell.

   The AUTHORIZED cell format is:

         'AuthMethod'                       [1 octet]
         'PadLen'                           [2 octets]
         'Padding'                          ['PadLen' octets]

   where all fields have the same meaning as in section 3.1.

3.3. Cell parsing

   Implementations MUST ignore the contents of 'Padding'.

   Implementations MUST reject an AUTHORIZE or AUTHORIZED cell where
   the 'Padding' field is not 'PadLen' octets long.

   Implementations MUST reject an AUTHORIZE cell with an 'AuthMethod'
   they don't recognize.

4. Discussion

4.1. What's up with the [1,3141] padding bytes range?

   The upper limit is larger than the Ethernet MTU so that AUTHORIZE
   and AUTHORIZED cells are not always transmitted into a single
   packet. Other than that, it's indeed pretty much arbitrary.

4.2. Why not let the pluggable transports do the padding, like they
     are supposed to do for the rest of the Tor protocol?

   The arguments of section "Alternative design: Just use pluggable
   transports" of proposal 187, apply here as well:

   All bridges who use client authorization will also need padded
   AUTHORIZE and AUTHORIZED cells.

4.3. How should multiple round-trip authorization protocols be handled?

   Protocols that require multiple round trips between the client and
   the bridge should use AUTHORIZE cells for communication.

   The format of the AUTHORIZE cell is flexible enough to support
   messages from the client to the bridge and the reverse.

   At the end of a successful multiple-round-trip protocol, an
   AUTHORIZED cell must be issued from the bridge to the client.

4.4. AUTHORIZED seems useless. Why not use VPADDING instead?

   As noted in proposal 187, the Tor protocol uses VPADDING cells for
   padding; any other use of VPADDING makes the Tor protocol kludgy.

   In the future, and in the example case of a v3 handshake, a client
   can optimistically send a VERSIONS cell along with the final
   AUTHORIZE cell of an authorization protocol. That allows the
   bridge, in the case of successful authorization, to also process
   the VERSIONS cell and begin the v3 handshake promptly.

4.5. What should actually happen when a bridge rejects an AUTHORIZE
     cell?

   When a bridge detects a badly formed or malicious AUTHORIZE cell,
   it should assume that the other side is an adversary scanning for
   bridges. The bridge should then act accordingly to avoid detection.

   This proposal does not try to specify how a bridge can avoid
   detection by an adversary.

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