From 1b62a02231edf0be499dbd7570bdbda94482463a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mike Perry Date: Tue, 26 Sep 2023 19:35:29 +0000 Subject: Prop324: Mark Finished and update sendme_inc prose --- proposals/324-rtt-congestion-control.txt | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'proposals/324-rtt-congestion-control.txt') diff --git a/proposals/324-rtt-congestion-control.txt b/proposals/324-rtt-congestion-control.txt index 582c54d..4235be8 100644 --- a/proposals/324-rtt-congestion-control.txt +++ b/proposals/324-rtt-congestion-control.txt @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Filename: 324-rtt-congestion-control.txt Title: RTT-based Congestion Control for Tor Author: Mike Perry Created: 02 July 2020 -Status: Open +Status: Finished 0. Motivation [MOTIVATION] @@ -2148,7 +2148,7 @@ The client MUST reject an ntorv3 reply with field EXT_FIELD_TYPE=02, if the client did not include EXT_FIELD_TYPE=01 in its handshake. The client SHOULD reject a sendme_inc field value that differs from the -current 'cc_sendme_inc' consensus parameter by more than a factor of 2, in +current 'cc_sendme_inc' consensus parameter by more than +/- 1, in either direction. If a client rejects a handshake, it MUST close the circuit. @@ -2159,8 +2159,7 @@ The pedantic reader will note that a rogue consensus can cause all clients to decide to close circuits by changing 'cc_sendme_inc' by a large margin. As a matter of policy, the directory authorities MUST NOT change -'cc_sendme_inc' by more than a factor of two (2), within a four (4) hour -window, for this reason. +'cc_sendme_inc' by more than +/- 1. In Shadow simulation, the optimal 'cc_sendme_inc' value to be ~31 cells, or one (1) TLS record worth of cells. We do not expect to change this value -- cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf