From 622b02c7ccf4d72a9b6b6066f87afa9804268e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roger Dingledine Date: Sun, 2 Dec 2007 13:51:16 +0000 Subject: another attack on bridges. darn it. svn:r12639 --- proposals/125-bridges.txt | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) (limited to 'proposals/125-bridges.txt') diff --git a/proposals/125-bridges.txt b/proposals/125-bridges.txt index 3b96ecd..1a3f6c5 100644 --- a/proposals/125-bridges.txt +++ b/proposals/125-bridges.txt @@ -329,3 +329,20 @@ Status: Open Once proposal 124 (modified TLS handshake) is in place, we should consider doing the switch. This might even be in the 0.2.0.x timeframe. +3.8. Do we need a second layer of entry guards? + + If the bridge user uses the bridge as its entry guard, then the + triangulation attacks from Lasse and Paul's Oakland paper work to + locate the user's bridge(s). + + Worse, this is another way to enumerate bridges: if the bridge users + keep rotating through second hops, then if you run a few fast servers + (and avoid getting considered an Exit or a Guard) you'll quickly get + a list of the bridges in active use. + + That's probably the strongest reason why bridge users will need to + pick second-layer guards. Would this mean bridge users should switch + to four-hop circuits? + + We should figure this out in the 0.2.1.x timeframe. + -- cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf