From b7f5a34928a1189f16ca24655df6fbc264b756c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roger Dingledine Date: Sun, 3 Aug 2008 15:34:28 +0000 Subject: update and integrate proposals 125 (bridges) and 137 (bootstrap status) svn:r16374 --- address-spec.txt | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'address-spec.txt') diff --git a/address-spec.txt b/address-spec.txt index 966f34c..2a84d85 100644 --- a/address-spec.txt +++ b/address-spec.txt @@ -5,10 +5,11 @@ $Id$ 1. Overview - Most of the time, Tor treats user-specified hostnames as opaque: When the - user connects to www.torproject.org, Tor picks an exit node and uses that node to - connect to "www.torproject.org". Some hostnames, however, can be used to override - Tor's default behavior and circuit-building rules. + Most of the time, Tor treats user-specified hostnames as opaque: When + the user connects to www.torproject.org, Tor picks an exit node and uses + that node to connect to "www.torproject.org". Some hostnames, however, + can be used to override Tor's default behavior and circuit-building + rules. These hostnames can be passed to Tor as the address part of a SOCKS4a or SOCKS5 request. If the application is connected to Tor using an IP-only -- cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf