/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** * \file onion_crypto.c * \brief Functions to handle different kinds of circuit extension crypto. * * In this module, we provide a set of abstractions to create a uniform * interface over the three circuit extension handshakes that Tor has used * over the years (TAP, CREATE_FAST, and ntor). These handshakes are * implemented in onion_tap.c, onion_fast.c, and onion_ntor.c respectively. * * All[*] of these handshakes follow a similar pattern: a client, knowing * some key from the relay it wants to extend through, generates the * first part of a handshake. A relay receives that handshake, and sends * a reply. Once the client handles the reply, it knows that it is * talking to the right relay, and it shares some freshly negotiated key * material with that relay. * * We sometimes call the client's part of the handshake an "onionskin". * We do this because historically, Onion Routing used a multi-layer * structure called an "onion" to construct circuits. Each layer of the * onion contained key material chosen by the client, the identity of * the next relay in the circuit, and a smaller onion, encrypted with * the key of the next relay. When we changed Tor to use a telescoping * circuit extension design, it corresponded to sending each layer of the * onion separately -- as a series of onionskins. **/ #include "core/or/or.h" #include "core/or/extendinfo.h" #include "core/crypto/onion_crypto.h" #include "core/crypto/onion_fast.h" #include "core/crypto/onion_ntor.h" #include "core/crypto/onion_ntor_v3.h" #include "core/crypto/onion_tap.h" #include "feature/relay/router.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" #include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h" #include "core/or/congestion_control_common.h" #include "core/or/circuitbuild.h" #include "core/or/crypt_path_st.h" #include "core/or/extend_info_st.h" #include "trunnel/congestion_control.h" #include "trunnel/extension.h" static const uint8_t NTOR3_CIRC_VERIFICATION[] = "circuit extend"; static const size_t NTOR3_CIRC_VERIFICATION_LEN = 14; #define NTOR3_VERIFICATION_ARGS \ NTOR3_CIRC_VERIFICATION, NTOR3_CIRC_VERIFICATION_LEN /** Return a new server_onion_keys_t object with all of the keys * and other info we might need to do onion handshakes. (We make a copy of * our keys for each cpuworker to avoid race conditions with the main thread, * and to avoid locking) */ server_onion_keys_t * server_onion_keys_new(void) { if (!get_master_identity_key()) return NULL; server_onion_keys_t *keys = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(server_onion_keys_t)); memcpy(keys->my_identity, router_get_my_id_digest(), DIGEST_LEN); ed25519_pubkey_copy(&keys->my_ed_identity, get_master_identity_key()); dup_onion_keys(&keys->onion_key, &keys->last_onion_key); keys->curve25519_key_map = construct_ntor_key_map(); keys->junk_keypair = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t)); curve25519_keypair_generate(keys->junk_keypair, 0); return keys; } /** Release all storage held in keys. */ void server_onion_keys_free_(server_onion_keys_t *keys) { if (! keys) return; crypto_pk_free(keys->onion_key); crypto_pk_free(keys->last_onion_key); ntor_key_map_free(keys->curve25519_key_map); tor_free(keys->junk_keypair); memwipe(keys, 0, sizeof(server_onion_keys_t)); tor_free(keys); } /** Release whatever storage is held in state, depending on its * type, and clear its pointer. */ void onion_handshake_state_release(onion_handshake_state_t *state) { switch (state->tag) { case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP: crypto_dh_free(state->u.tap); state->u.tap = NULL; break; case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST: fast_handshake_state_free(state->u.fast); state->u.fast = NULL; break; case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR: ntor_handshake_state_free(state->u.ntor); state->u.ntor = NULL; break; case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR_V3: ntor3_handshake_state_free(state->u.ntor3); break; default: /* LCOV_EXCL_START * This state should not even exist. */ log_warn(LD_BUG, "called with unknown handshake state type %d", (int)state->tag); tor_fragile_assert(); /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ } } /** Perform the first step of a circuit-creation handshake of type type * (one of ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_*): generate the initial "onion skin" in * onion_skin_out with length of up to onion_skin_out_maxlen, * and store any state information in state_out. * Return -1 on failure, and the length of the onionskin on acceptance. */ int onion_skin_create(int type, const extend_info_t *node, onion_handshake_state_t *state_out, uint8_t *onion_skin_out, size_t onion_skin_out_maxlen) { int r = -1; switch (type) { case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP: if (onion_skin_out_maxlen < TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN) return -1; if (!node->onion_key) return -1; if (onion_skin_TAP_create(node->onion_key, &state_out->u.tap, (char*)onion_skin_out) < 0) return -1; r = TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN; break; case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST: if (fast_onionskin_create(&state_out->u.fast, onion_skin_out) < 0) return -1; r = CREATE_FAST_LEN; break; case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR: if (onion_skin_out_maxlen < NTOR_ONIONSKIN_LEN) return -1; if (!extend_info_supports_ntor(node)) return -1; if (onion_skin_ntor_create((const uint8_t*)node->identity_digest, &node->curve25519_onion_key, &state_out->u.ntor, onion_skin_out) < 0) return -1; r = NTOR_ONIONSKIN_LEN; break; case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR_V3: if (!extend_info_supports_ntor_v3(node)) return -1; if (ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&node->ed_identity)) return -1; size_t msg_len = 0; uint8_t *msg = NULL; if (client_circ_negotiation_message(node, &msg, &msg_len) < 0) return -1; uint8_t *onion_skin = NULL; size_t onion_skin_len = 0; int status = onion_skin_ntor3_create( &node->ed_identity, &node->curve25519_onion_key, NTOR3_VERIFICATION_ARGS, msg, msg_len, /* client message */ &state_out->u.ntor3, &onion_skin, &onion_skin_len); tor_free(msg); if (status < 0) { return -1; } if (onion_skin_len > onion_skin_out_maxlen) { tor_free(onion_skin); return -1; } memcpy(onion_skin_out, onion_skin, onion_skin_len); tor_free(onion_skin); r = (int) onion_skin_len; break; default: /* LCOV_EXCL_START * We should never try to create an impossible handshake type. */ log_warn(LD_BUG, "called with unknown handshake state type %d", type); tor_fragile_assert(); r = -1; /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ } if (r > 0) state_out->tag = (uint16_t) type; return r; } /** * Takes a param request message from the client, compares it to our * consensus parameters, and creates a reply message and output * parameters. * * This function runs in a worker thread, so it can only inspect * arguments and local variables. * * Returns 0 if successful. * Returns -1 on parsing, parameter failure, or reply creation failure. */ static int negotiate_v3_ntor_server_circ_params(const uint8_t *param_request_msg, size_t param_request_len, const circuit_params_t *our_ns_params, circuit_params_t *params_out, uint8_t **resp_msg_out, size_t *resp_msg_len_out) { int ret; /* Parse request. */ ret = congestion_control_parse_ext_request(param_request_msg, param_request_len); if (ret < 0) { goto err; } params_out->cc_enabled = ret && our_ns_params->cc_enabled; /* Build the response. */ ret = congestion_control_build_ext_response(our_ns_params, params_out, resp_msg_out, resp_msg_len_out); if (ret < 0) { goto err; } params_out->sendme_inc_cells = our_ns_params->sendme_inc_cells; /* Success. */ ret = 0; err: return ret; } /* This is the maximum value for keys_out_len passed to * onion_skin_server_handshake, plus 16. We can make it bigger if needed: * It just defines how many bytes to stack-allocate. */ #define MAX_KEYS_TMP_LEN 128 /** Perform the second (server-side) step of a circuit-creation handshake of * type type, responding to the client request in onion_skin * using the keys in keys. On success, write our response into * reply_out, generate keys_out_len bytes worth of key material * in keys_out_len, a hidden service nonce to rend_nonce_out, * and return the length of the reply. On failure, return -1. */ int onion_skin_server_handshake(int type, const uint8_t *onion_skin, size_t onionskin_len, const server_onion_keys_t *keys, const circuit_params_t *our_ns_params, uint8_t *reply_out, size_t reply_out_maxlen, uint8_t *keys_out, size_t keys_out_len, uint8_t *rend_nonce_out, circuit_params_t *params_out) { int r = -1; memset(params_out, 0, sizeof(*params_out)); switch (type) { case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP: if (reply_out_maxlen < TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN) return -1; if (onionskin_len != TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN) return -1; if (onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake((const char*)onion_skin, keys->onion_key, keys->last_onion_key, (char*)reply_out, (char*)keys_out, keys_out_len)<0) return -1; r = TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN; memcpy(rend_nonce_out, reply_out+DH1024_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN); break; case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST: if (reply_out_maxlen < CREATED_FAST_LEN) return -1; if (onionskin_len != CREATE_FAST_LEN) return -1; if (fast_server_handshake(onion_skin, reply_out, keys_out, keys_out_len)<0) return -1; r = CREATED_FAST_LEN; memcpy(rend_nonce_out, reply_out+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN); break; case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR: if (reply_out_maxlen < NTOR_REPLY_LEN) return -1; if (onionskin_len < NTOR_ONIONSKIN_LEN) return -1; { size_t keys_tmp_len = keys_out_len + DIGEST_LEN; tor_assert(keys_tmp_len <= MAX_KEYS_TMP_LEN); uint8_t keys_tmp[MAX_KEYS_TMP_LEN]; if (onion_skin_ntor_server_handshake( onion_skin, keys->curve25519_key_map, keys->junk_keypair, keys->my_identity, reply_out, keys_tmp, keys_tmp_len)<0) { /* no need to memwipe here, since the output will never be used */ return -1; } memcpy(keys_out, keys_tmp, keys_out_len); memcpy(rend_nonce_out, keys_tmp+keys_out_len, DIGEST_LEN); memwipe(keys_tmp, 0, sizeof(keys_tmp)); r = NTOR_REPLY_LEN; } break; case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR_V3: { size_t keys_tmp_len = keys_out_len + DIGEST_LEN; tor_assert(keys_tmp_len <= MAX_KEYS_TMP_LEN); uint8_t keys_tmp[MAX_KEYS_TMP_LEN]; uint8_t *client_msg = NULL; size_t client_msg_len = 0; uint8_t *reply_msg = NULL; size_t reply_msg_len = 0; ntor3_server_handshake_state_t *state = NULL; if (onion_skin_ntor3_server_handshake_part1( keys->curve25519_key_map, keys->junk_keypair, &keys->my_ed_identity, onion_skin, onionskin_len, NTOR3_VERIFICATION_ARGS, &client_msg, &client_msg_len, &state) < 0) { return -1; } if (negotiate_v3_ntor_server_circ_params(client_msg, client_msg_len, our_ns_params, params_out, &reply_msg, &reply_msg_len) < 0) { ntor3_server_handshake_state_free(state); tor_free(client_msg); return -1; } tor_free(client_msg); uint8_t *server_handshake = NULL; size_t server_handshake_len = 0; if (onion_skin_ntor3_server_handshake_part2( state, NTOR3_VERIFICATION_ARGS, reply_msg, reply_msg_len, &server_handshake, &server_handshake_len, keys_tmp, keys_tmp_len) < 0) { tor_free(reply_msg); ntor3_server_handshake_state_free(state); return -1; } tor_free(reply_msg); if (server_handshake_len > reply_out_maxlen) { tor_free(server_handshake); ntor3_server_handshake_state_free(state); return -1; } memcpy(keys_out, keys_tmp, keys_out_len); memcpy(rend_nonce_out, keys_tmp+keys_out_len, DIGEST_LEN); memcpy(reply_out, server_handshake, server_handshake_len); memwipe(keys_tmp, 0, keys_tmp_len); memwipe(server_handshake, 0, server_handshake_len); tor_free(server_handshake); ntor3_server_handshake_state_free(state); r = (int) server_handshake_len; } break; default: /* LCOV_EXCL_START * We should have rejected this far before this point */ log_warn(LD_BUG, "called with unknown handshake state type %d", type); tor_fragile_assert(); return -1; /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ } return r; } /** * Takes a param response message from the exit, compares it to our * consensus parameters for sanity, and creates output parameters * if sane. * * Returns -1 on parsing or insane params, 0 if success. */ static int negotiate_v3_ntor_client_circ_params(const uint8_t *param_response_msg, size_t param_response_len, circuit_params_t *params_out) { int ret = congestion_control_parse_ext_response(param_response_msg, param_response_len, params_out); if (ret < 0) { return -1; } /* If congestion control came back enabled, but we didn't ask for it * because the consensus said no, close the circuit. * * This is a fatal error condition for the circuit, because it either * means that congestion control was disabled by the consensus * during the handshake, or the exit decided to send us an unsolicited * congestion control response. * * In either case, we cannot proceed on this circuit, and must try a * new one. */ if (ret && !congestion_control_enabled()) { return -1; } params_out->cc_enabled = ret; return 0; } /** Perform the final (client-side) step of a circuit-creation handshake of * type type, using our state in handshake_state and the * server's response in reply. On success, generate keys_out_len * bytes worth of key material in keys_out_len, set * rend_authenticator_out to the "KH" field that can be used to * establish introduction points at this hop, and return 0. On failure, * return -1, and set *msg_out to an error message if this is worth * complaining to the user about. */ int onion_skin_client_handshake(int type, const onion_handshake_state_t *handshake_state, const uint8_t *reply, size_t reply_len, uint8_t *keys_out, size_t keys_out_len, uint8_t *rend_authenticator_out, circuit_params_t *params_out, const char **msg_out) { if (handshake_state->tag != type) return -1; memset(params_out, 0, sizeof(*params_out)); switch (type) { case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP: if (reply_len != TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN) { if (msg_out) *msg_out = "TAP reply was not of the correct length."; return -1; } if (onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(handshake_state->u.tap, (const char*)reply, (char *)keys_out, keys_out_len, msg_out) < 0) return -1; memcpy(rend_authenticator_out, reply+DH1024_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN); return 0; case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST: if (reply_len != CREATED_FAST_LEN) { if (msg_out) *msg_out = "TAP reply was not of the correct length."; return -1; } if (fast_client_handshake(handshake_state->u.fast, reply, keys_out, keys_out_len, msg_out) < 0) return -1; memcpy(rend_authenticator_out, reply+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN); return 0; case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR: if (reply_len < NTOR_REPLY_LEN) { if (msg_out) *msg_out = "ntor reply was not of the correct length."; return -1; } { size_t keys_tmp_len = keys_out_len + DIGEST_LEN; uint8_t *keys_tmp = tor_malloc(keys_tmp_len); if (onion_skin_ntor_client_handshake(handshake_state->u.ntor, reply, keys_tmp, keys_tmp_len, msg_out) < 0) { tor_free(keys_tmp); return -1; } memcpy(keys_out, keys_tmp, keys_out_len); memcpy(rend_authenticator_out, keys_tmp + keys_out_len, DIGEST_LEN); memwipe(keys_tmp, 0, keys_tmp_len); tor_free(keys_tmp); } return 0; case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR_V3: { size_t keys_tmp_len = keys_out_len + DIGEST_LEN; uint8_t *keys_tmp = tor_malloc(keys_tmp_len); uint8_t *server_msg = NULL; size_t server_msg_len = 0; int r = onion_ntor3_client_handshake( handshake_state->u.ntor3, reply, reply_len, NTOR3_VERIFICATION_ARGS, keys_tmp, keys_tmp_len, &server_msg, &server_msg_len); if (r < 0) { tor_free(keys_tmp); tor_free(server_msg); return -1; } if (negotiate_v3_ntor_client_circ_params(server_msg, server_msg_len, params_out) < 0) { tor_free(keys_tmp); tor_free(server_msg); return -1; } tor_free(server_msg); memcpy(keys_out, keys_tmp, keys_out_len); memcpy(rend_authenticator_out, keys_tmp + keys_out_len, DIGEST_LEN); memwipe(keys_tmp, 0, keys_tmp_len); tor_free(keys_tmp); return 0; } default: log_warn(LD_BUG, "called with unknown handshake state type %d", type); tor_fragile_assert(); return -1; } }