From d2b4b49ff043df43c048b6f1f52a34dd5c4c0108 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Karsten Loesing Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2009 23:47:05 -0700 Subject: Reduce log level for someone else sending us weak DH keys. See task 1114. The most plausible explanation for someone sending us weak DH keys is that they experiment with their Tor code or implement a new Tor client. Usually, we don't care about such events, especially not on warn level. If we really care about someone not following the Tor protocol, we can set ProtocolWarnings to 1. --- src/test/test_crypto.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/test/test_crypto.c') diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c index 2edb8035bb..670fd0048f 100644 --- a/src/test/test_crypto.c +++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ test_crypto_dh(void) memset(s1, 0, DH_BYTES); memset(s2, 0xFF, DH_BYTES); - s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(dh1, p2, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); - s2len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(dh2, p1, DH_BYTES, s2, 50); + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p2, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); + s2len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh2, p1, DH_BYTES, s2, 50); test_assert(s1len > 0); test_eq(s1len, s2len); test_memeq(s1, s2, s1len); -- cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf