From 23fdfd4dcff24d45c78ffcae7d9dc5398b0c2150 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roger Dingledine Date: Sat, 3 Nov 2007 14:44:53 +0000 Subject: Stop leaking conn->nickname every time we make a connection to a Tor relay without knowing its expected identity digest (e.g. when using bridges). Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha. svn:r12355 --- src/or/connection_or.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'src/or/connection_or.c') diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index b910bdfbcb..eb8ca58fc6 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -663,6 +663,7 @@ connection_or_check_valid_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here, if (started_here && tor_digest_is_zero(conn->identity_digest)) { memcpy(conn->identity_digest, digest_rcvd, DIGEST_LEN); + tor_free(conn->nickname); conn->nickname = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2); conn->nickname[0] = '$'; base16_encode(conn->nickname+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, -- cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf