From a94fef2e6771f5e293e82cb88abe34828841687a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roger Dingledine Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2005 20:53:06 +0000 Subject: an abstract, that needs more work svn:r3519 --- doc/design-paper/challenges.tex | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'doc') diff --git a/doc/design-paper/challenges.tex b/doc/design-paper/challenges.tex index 4dea199f5e..d51b6c2027 100644 --- a/doc/design-paper/challenges.tex +++ b/doc/design-paper/challenges.tex @@ -24,7 +24,18 @@ \pagestyle{empty} \begin{abstract} -foo + +We describe our experiences with deploying Tor, a low-latency anonymous +communication system that has been funded both by the U.S.~government +and also by the Electronic Frontier Foundation. + +Because of its simplified threat model, Tor does not aim to defend +against many of the attacks in the literature. + +We describe both policy issues that have come up from operating the +network and technical challenges in building a more sustainable and +scalable network. + \end{abstract} \section{Introduction} @@ -42,7 +53,7 @@ Subject to this restriction, we try to provide as much anonymity as we can. In particular, because we support interactive communications without impractically expensive padding, we fall prey to a variety -of intra-network~\cite{attack-tor-oak05,flow-correlation04,bar} and +of intra-network~\cite{back01,attack-tor-oak05,flow-correlation04} and end-to-end~\cite{danezis-pet2004,SS03} anonymity-breaking attacks. Tor is secure so long as adversaries are unable to -- cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf