From 41f96078c23e3ef1c39a853841332cac3e133a94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: teor Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2016 16:22:07 +1000 Subject: Refactor UseEntryNodes so the original configured value is preserved Parse the value to UseEntryNodes_option, then set UseEntryNodes before validating options. This way, Authorities, Tor2web, and Single Onion Services don't write spurious "UseEntryNodes 0" lines to their configs. Document the fact that these tor configurations ignore UseEntryNodes in the manual page. Also reorder options validation so we modify UseEntryNodes first, then check its value against EntryNodes. And silence a warning about disabled UseEntryNodes for hidden services when we're actually in non-anonymous single onion service mode. --- doc/tor.1.txt | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'doc/tor.1.txt') diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index bd25a614a8..f353637d67 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1184,7 +1184,9 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and try to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly changing servers increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a - fraction of your paths. (Default: 1) + fraction of your paths. Entry Guards can not be used by Directory + Authorities, Single Onion Services, and Tor2web clients. In these cases, + the this option is ignored. (Default: 1) [[UseEntryGuardsAsDirGuards]] **UseEntryGuardsAsDirGuards** **0**|**1**:: If this option is set to 1, and UseEntryGuards is also set to 1, -- cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf