From 343f7aa05967df43c3f7e5b392b66e21c08b7cb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nick Mathewson Date: Fri, 15 Feb 2013 17:24:13 -0500 Subject: Make the guard lifetime configurable and adjustable via the consensus Fixes 8240. (Don't actually increase the default guard lifetime. It seems likely to break too many things if done precipitiously.) --- doc/tor.1.txt | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'doc/tor.1.txt') diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 773fccf536..5cf5a718c0 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -959,6 +959,12 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers as long-term entries for our circuits. (Default: 3) +**HeartbeatPeriod** __N__ **days**|**weeks**|**months**:: + If nonzero, and UseEntryGuards is set, minimum time to keep a guard before + picking a new one. If zero, we use the GuardLifetime parameter from the + consensus directory. No value here may be less than 2 months or greater + than 5 years; out-of-range values are clamped. (Default: 0) + **SafeSocks** **0**|**1**:: When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that use unsafe variants of the socks protocol -- ones that only provide an IP -- cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf