From 308f6dad20675c42b29862f4269ad1fbfb00dc9a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Robert Ransom Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2012 17:15:54 +0000 Subject: Mitigate a side-channel leak of which relays Tor chooses for a circuit Tor's and OpenSSL's current design guarantee that there are other leaks, but this one is likely to be more easily exploitable, and is easy to fix. --- changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) create mode 100644 changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a (limited to 'changes') diff --git a/changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a b/changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cad2af5c0d --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ + o Security fixes: + + - Try to leak less information about what relays a client is + choosing to a side-channel attacker. Previously, a Tor client + would stop iterating through the list of available relays as + soon as it had chosen one, thus leaking information about which + relays it picked for a circuit to a timing attack. (Tor is + likely to still leak information about which relays it has + chosen for a circuit to other processes on the same computer, + through e.g. which cache lines it loads while building the + circuit.) + -- cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf