From 6573da7f00cad3d1c79369386da563bdd90a2fcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Palfrader Date: Wed, 14 May 2008 20:29:47 +0000 Subject: * backport from 0.2.0.26-rc-1: Conflict with old libssls. * backport from 0.2.0.26-rc-1: On upgrading from versions prior to, including, 0.1.2.19-2 if we are a server (we have a /var/lib/tor/keys directory) - move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_onion_key out of the way. - move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_onion_key.old out of the way. - move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key out of the way if it was created on or after 2006-09-17, which is the day the bad libssl was uploaded to Debian unstable. * backport from 0.2.0.26-rc-1: Add a NEWS file explaining this change. svn:r14616 --- debian/changelog | 16 +++++++++++--- debian/control | 1 + debian/tor.NEWS | 16 ++++++++++++++ debian/tor.postinst | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 debian/tor.NEWS diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog index cca336e3ea..231e6e0951 100644 --- a/debian/changelog +++ b/debian/changelog @@ -1,10 +1,20 @@ -tor (0.1.2.19-3) unstableunreleased; urgency=low +tor (0.1.2.19-3) unstable; urgency=critical * It's 2008. Now is the time to add copyright statements for 2007. * Work around fig2dev failing to build the images on all archs - backport from 0.2.0.22-rc-1 (re #457568). - - -- Peter Palfrader Wed, 14 May 2008 15:00:47 +0200 + * backport from 0.2.0.26-rc-1: Conflict with old libssls. + * backport from 0.2.0.26-rc-1: On upgrading from versions prior to, + including, 0.1.2.19-2 if we are a server (we have a /var/lib/tor/keys + directory) + - move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_onion_key out of the way. + - move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_onion_key.old out of the way. + - move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key out of the way if it was + created on or after 2006-09-17, which is the day the bad + libssl was uploaded to Debian unstable. + * backport from 0.2.0.26-rc-1: Add a NEWS file explaining this change. + + -- Peter Palfrader Wed, 14 May 2008 15:05:47 +0200 tor (0.1.2.19-2) unstable; urgency=low diff --git a/debian/control b/debian/control index 03b41991f6..e2aa2d1fd9 100644 --- a/debian/control +++ b/debian/control @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ Standards-Version: 3.7.2 Package: tor Architecture: any Depends: ${shlibs:Depends}, adduser, tsocks +Conflicts: libssl0.9.8 (<< 0.9.8g-9) Recommends: privoxy | polipo (>= 1), socat Suggests: mixmaster, mixminion, anon-proxy Description: anonymizing overlay network for TCP diff --git a/debian/tor.NEWS b/debian/tor.NEWS new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..18860ccaae --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/tor.NEWS @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +tor (0.2.0.26-rc-1) experimental; urgency=critical + + * weak cryptographic keys + + It has been discovered that the random number generator in Debian's + openssl package is predictable. This is caused by an incorrect + Debian-specific change to the openssl package (CVE-2008-0166). As a + result, cryptographic key material may be guessable. + + See Debian Security Advisory number 1571 (DSA-1571) for more information: + http://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2008/msg00152.html + + If you run a Tor server using this package please see + /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/README.REALLY + + -- Peter Palfrader Tue, 13 May 2008 12:49:05 +0200 diff --git a/debian/tor.postinst b/debian/tor.postinst index 3224a32607..3d6423eac2 100644 --- a/debian/tor.postinst +++ b/debian/tor.postinst @@ -61,6 +61,68 @@ else fi fi + +move_away_keys=0 + +if [ "$1" = "configure" ] && + [ -e /var/lib/tor/keys ] && + [ ! -z "$2" ]; then + if dpkg --compare-versions "$2" lt 0.1.2.19-2; then + move_away_keys=1 + fi +fi +if [ "$move_away_keys" = "1" ]; then + echo "Retiring possibly compromised keys. See /usr/share/doc/tor/NEWS.Debian.gz" + echo "and /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/README.REALLY for" + echo "further information." + if ! [ -d /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package ]; then + mkdir /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package + cat > /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/README.REALLY << EOF +It has been discovered that the random number generator in Debian's +openssl package is predictable. This is caused by an incorrect +Debian-specific change to the openssl package (CVE-2008-0166). As a +result, cryptographic key material may be guessable. + +See Debian Security Advisory number 1571 (DSA-1571) for more information: +http://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2008/msg00152.html + +The Debian package for Tor has moved away the onion keys upon package +upgrade, and it will have moved away your identity key if it was created +in the affected timeframe. There is no sure way to automatically tell +if your key was created with an affected openssl library, so this move +is done unconditionally. + +If you have restarted Tor since this change (and the package probably +did that for you already unless you configured your system differently) +then the Tor daemon already created new keys for itself and in all +likelyhood is already working just fine with new keys. + +If you are absolutely certain that your identity key was created with +a non-affected version of openssl and for some reason you have to retain +the old identity, then you can move back the copy of secret_id_key to +/var/lib/tor/keys. Do not move back the onion keys, they were created +only recently since they are temporary keys with a lifetime of only a few +days anyway. + +Sincerely, +Peter Palfrader, Tue, 13 May 2008 13:32:23 +0200 +EOF + fi + for f in secret_onion_key secret_onion_key.old; do + if [ -e /var/lib/tor/keys/"$f" ]; then + mv -v /var/lib/tor/keys/"$f" /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/"$f" + fi + done + if [ -e /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key ]; then + id_mtime=`/usr/bin/stat -c %Y /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key` + sept=`date -d '2006-09-10' +%s` + if [ "$id_mtime" -gt "$sept" ] ; then + mv -v /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/secret_id_key + fi + fi +fi + + #DEBHELPER# exit 0 -- cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf